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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM AND THE PROCEDURE
Civil liberty connotes a freedom i mplying a right
to protection against both governm ent al and private
interference, but it is essentially a right of the individual against the authoritarian state.

In these days

of world-wide struggle between oppo sing political philosophies there is much thought given to human rights an d
civil liberties.

Under totalitarian governm ents in

much of the world, civil ri ghts have all but v anished.
In the Democracies, under stress of war, personal liberties disappear.
Democracy does not guarantee liberties to t he
individual, since there is constant danger that the
majority will disregard the rights of the minority .

To

cite only one example, there has been in .Americ a a flagrant violation of the civil rights of the negro through
lack of proper adlninistrati on of laws intended to protect
him.

In the Democracies, as in the tota.li tarian states,

the modern tendency is toward a relaxation in civil
liberty and a loss of many s pecific rights of the individual.

Increasing governmental control, necessitated

2

by the complexities of modern social and i ndustrial
life, results in continuous encroachments upon the
rights fund amental to the older philosophy of individualism.

Under guise of protecting health, morals,

and safety the maj ority has succeeded in ~rriting into
law its views on morality, reli gion, and politics in
such a way a s frequently to interfere with the civil
liberties of i n dividuals •
.America contributed to the idea of protecting
civil liberties by writing guarant ees of such liberties
into constitutions which could not be easily changed,
and then uniquely provided f or review of s uch guarantees by the courts.

This places in the hands of the

courts the final decision as to the scope of civil
liberties in A.merica.

The Bills of Ri ghts as they stand

today in our federal and state constitutions are little
more than collections of glittering generalities until
applied to specific cases by decisions of the courts.
The Problem
The people of Kansas are gua~anteed certain rights
and liberties in the twenty sections of the Bill Of
Rights in the Kansas constitution, but there is room for
much difference of opinion as to just what thes e quarantees include.

The right to ttlife, libert y , and pursuit
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of happiness" as provided in Section I is so gener al
as to be open to dozens of interpret ations and can
have little real meaning until applied to specific
cases.
It is the purpose of this thesi s to s how t he
meaning of the Kansas Bill of Rights as determined by
the Kansas Supreme Court in the many ca ses whi ch have
involved t hese ri ghts.

The thesis can show to t he

reader only wh at the court has determined in th e p a s t
and the meaning of the Bill of Rights onl y as i t
applies oo those situations which h ave been brought
before the court.

There ar e v ast, potentia l meanings

which will be brou ght to light only in t he f uture a s
the court is asked to decide in other cas e s t he meaning
of the constitution and the l aw.
Since there is so much concer n at the pre s ent
time over the preservation of personal liber t ies, and
since the general constitutional guarant ees mean so
little without court interp r etation, and since t he l ayman is not f amiliar with past interpretations--it seems
important to present in t hi s thesis t he meaning of t he
Kansas Bill of Rights as determined by the Court.

So

far as the writer is able to determine there has been
no research on this particular phase of t he Kansas Constitution and the matter has been one of concern only
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for judges and lawyers.
The Procedure
In determining the meaning of t he Kans as Bill
of Ri ghts, Supreme Court cases f r om 1861 t o an d i ncluding 1940 were s t udies.

Shepard's Citatio ns ,

Hatcher's Di gest, Constitutiona l Annotations, and
Court Report indexes wer e consulted in an at tempt to
locate each and every case which p ertai n ed i n any way
to any sec t ion of t he Bill of Rights. · Many of the
ca ses s t udied f a iled to show any definit e gr ound s f or
viola tion of the Bill of Ri ghts and are not i ncluded
herein.

Each ca se was studied to determi ne t he po i nt

of law a nd the principles e s t ab lished by t he de c ision.
It is these court determined principl es that are offered
as the est ablished meaning of the Kansas Bill of Ri ghts.
The Orga ni zation
In the chapters that f ollow , there wi l l be presented a brief review of the history of civil l ibert i es
from a ncient times through t he :Medieva l and modern per i ods;
the English bac kground of Juner ican lib er ties ; and t he
development of individual rights in t h e .Americ an colonies
and in the young United Sta tes.

A s peci al ch apter will be

devoted to the i mmediate historic al background of t he
Kansas Bill of Ri ghts, sho,Afing how it wa s transpla nt ed
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from earlier Ohio constituti ons; and t hen in f ive
chapters there will be

set forth the princip les of

personal liberties as they have been determi ned by the
Kansas Supreme Court in s pecif ic c ases.
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CHAPTER II
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Civil Liberty a Product of the Past
Civil liberty is essentially a modern concept,
allied with philosophies of individualism and liber alism,
but one can not fully understand this concept vdthout
realization that it is a. product of the past .

Some of

the guarantees which are written into pr esent day constitutions were won centuries a.go as a result of long
struggle against authoritarian states .

Through the years

these p ersona l liberties were successively attained and
lost as they gradually won l ast· ng foothold s which today
are firmly embedded in .Amer ic an const itutions to be given
meaning by .American courts.
Personal Liberty in .Ancient Times
Civil liberty was unknown to th e ancient world.

In

the early days of civilization there was only one philosophy of sovereignty.

The individual belonged to the

state body and soul and t he despotisms of this early age
had no room for the concept of individual rights .

Even

under the Greek democracy there was little real civil
lbierty since the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle
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suborinated the individua.l to the state.

Individual

rights that did exist in the Greelc democracy could at
any time be swept away by the majority without r estriction.
Similarly , the Romans guaranteed no l asting per sonal
liberties.
Eersonal Liberty in Medieval Times
The first germs of civil liberty app eared in the
Stoic Philos9phy of justice to t he individua l and were
later developed in the doctrine of Christi anity .

This

doctrine alleged t o the individua l hiraself duti~s and
obligations hi gher t han tho se imposed by tempora l ruler s
and thus created a philosppµy which could regar d resistance to constituted authority in cert a i n ca ses as an
act of piety rather than of here s y .

Suc h a philosophy

prepared the way for the later doctrine of natural
ri ghts.

The Renaiss ance a nd the Refo rmat ion f urther ed

the idea of individual liberty and toleration.

Media eval

towns and cities he'id various right s and privileges whi ch
were virtual libe-rties of the individual.

The growth of

the national state with its resort to repres entativ e
government emphasized the f act that the individua l citizen
was a thing apart from the state with interests and
privileges of his ovm.

A conception of individual liberty

found little place in feudal society though the feudal
technique of bargain and contract undoubtedly i:Q.lluenced
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the methods by which civil libert y was l ater s ecured.
English Li berti es
The immediate background for Amer ican civil liberties
is f ound in England.

There the struggle for civil

lib erties began as a phase of the strugg le of t he feud a l
lords to maint a in some degre e of aut onomy i n the f a ce of
inc r easing centralizat i on of p ower in the hands of the
king .

Privileg es and rights won by limited groups were

gradu ally extended to all clas ses and the idea of civil
libert y became embodied in doctrine and its principles
preserved in writt en documents.
Magna Cart a
The earliest of these docmnents wa s the Magna Carta
which was VITung by the barons from King John in 1215 .
There is much dis agreement as to the pla c e of Magna Cart a
in t he history of civil lib erties.

Radin 1 says t hat this

document gave the feudal propert y law its form and direction
and secured merely a s a sort of cas u a l incident some of t he
political rights of free me n of t he t ime .

Bruun 2 says t hat

when in the seventeenth century, the pa rli ame ntar y opp osition
cited Magna Carta a s t he original guaranty of liberty , f a ir
trial, and represent at ive gover nment, they wer e misreading
what was in reality a feud a l a greement.

Magna Carta did

incident ally state cert ain arbitrary a cts from whi ch the king
1.
2.

Radin, Anglo-Americ an Legal History. p . 531.
Bruun, A Survey of Europe an Civilizati on . Vol. I , p. 197 .
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was to refrain, forba de the sale of justice, and he ld
that no man was to be deprived of property, i mprisoned,
or banished sa.ve by le gal judgment of his peers and the
law of the land.
The Petit i on of Ri ghts
This meager list of ri ghts was enla r ged by the
Petition of Ri ghts which Charles I reluctantly accepted
in 1628 in return for parli amentary co operation i n raising
taxes.

This petition , one of the cornerstones of British

freedom , was a clear s tatement of the illegality of the
exercise of absolute p ower to infringe certain crucial
rights.

It condemned the billeting of s oldiers upon the

people, the collec t ion of lo ans or taxes not s anctioned
by Parli ament, and the i mpriso nment of any pers on vd t hout
specific char ge or orderly trial.
The Bill of Ri ghts
The third gre at charter of Engli sh liberty was the
Bill of Ri ghts which emerged from the Revoluti on of 1688.
This document provided: 3 (1) That the sov erei gn ha d no
power to suspend or disp ense with the laws, to erect
special courts of justice, maintain a standing army, or
levy taxes without the consent of Parliament.

(2)

That

Parliament should meet frequently, the members to be
freely elected and allowed freedom in their debates.
3.

----------------------------------------------------Ibid., p. 47.
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(3) That subjects were entitled to peti t ion t h e monarch
without fe ar of prosecution, th at th ose ch ar ged with crimes
could not be refused jury trial, nor could t he y be exposed
to cruel or unusual puni shments.
It is out of such s pecific provis io ns as t hos e found
in the documents above that t h e gener a l doctr i ne of civil
liberties h a s develo ped----Though it should b e r emembered
that these documents in turn have b orrowed fr om prin cip les
of Comm.on Law and from fun damentals of liber t y which wer e
a ch ievffinents of other peoples before t h em.
Personal Liberty i n the .Araeric an Coloni es
Coloniza tion of .Americ a gav e n ew fo r s e to the growt h
of civil liberties .,

Many colonies wer e prot ect ed by charter s

or definite contra cts to which t hey

uld appe al as defens e

a gainst arbitrary or oppre s s ive measur es .

By r efusing t o

vote local taxes for administration an d defens e th e coloni sts
could gargain for privileges which sometimes exc e eded t ho se
of Englishmen at home.

Thus through custom, bar ga in, and

a cquiesence the range of civil li ber t y was extended , though
in greatly varyi ng degrees as the thirte en colonies gave
different connotations to freedom of sp eech, press, assemblage, and religion.

Later when Engl and sought to squelch

these growing liberties in the Americ an colonies, Revolution
burst forth and the struggle for individua l lib erty was
tied to a struggle for nationa l autonomy.

This struggle
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was bac ked by a philosophy of f re edom s et f or th i n t he
Declaration of Indep end ence.
The Declar at ion of I nd epen denc e
Th e Americ an Decla rati on of Ind ep enden ce i s a
rest at ement of the phi losophy of natur a l ri ght s which
was elabora ted by John Loc ke at t he t ime of the Engl i sh
Revolution of 1688 .

This documen t held that cert ain

rights, among them the r i ght of lif e, l i ber t y , and purs uit of happines s, a re n atur a l an d i nal ienabl e an d ar e
f orev er reserved to t he individua l.

Th e Dec l ar a tion

as serted the doctrin e t hat gov ernm ent i s t he agent of
it.s

people, a nd i t i mpli ed rights much bro ader than

those expressed in p revious En gli sh char t er s .

It

possessed f lexibili ty which mad e p os s i bl e addi t i on of
new rights or i mmunities a s they came to be de emed f undamental, and it announ ced a polit ic al philosophy whi ch
later was incorporated into t he Const i t ut i on of the
United. States.
The Constitution of the U.

s.

The United Sta tes Cons titution origi nally cont ained
no st atement of civil liberti es beyond prot ect i on aga i nst
bills of attainder, ex po s t f a cto l aws , punishme nt for
constructive treason, obligation of cont r a ct s , a nd deni a l
of habeas corpus and tria l by j ury in cr i mi nal ca ses .
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North Carolina refused to ratify t he Constitution
because it contained no Bill of Ri ghts, and severa l
other states ratified with the understanding t hat i mmediate opportunity would b e g iven for amendment.

Out

of almost eighty amendments proposed, tne were a dopted,
and the Constitution h ad A Bill of Rights wh i a.h guarenteed civil liberties to its people.

The provisions were

for the most part copied from existing state constitutions
which were in turn exp ressions of the civil r i ghts of
Englishmen of the day .

The Constitution did not create

civil liberty--it expressed traditions which ha d existed
for centuries in Anglo-Saxon life.

Th is .Americ an Bill

of Rights denies to Congress the power of making l aws
interfering ¼~th reli gious freedom, or abr idging the freedom, o~ the press or the ri ght of p etit i on; it guar ant e es
the citizen against arbitrary arrest and a.gs.inst unreasonable search and seizure; it asserts i n positive t erms t he
right of trial by jury ; it forbids exc essiv e ba il, excessive fines, and excessive i mprison.ments; it declares
that all powers that lie outside those enume ra ted in hhe
Constitution as belonging to the Federal Gov e r nment are
reserved to the people and to the s t a tes.
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CHAPTER III
HISTORY OF THE KANSAS BILL OF RI Gms
Territorial Constitutions
From the turmail created in the territory of Kansas
by the struggle between anti-s laver y and pro- s l avery
factions, ther e emerged in les s than four yea.rs four
separate sta t e constitutions , each. one framed by a convention, submit t ed to popular vote, and by its own
partisans declared adopted.
in order were:

Thes e four c onstitutions

(1) Topeka fr ee-st ate constitution of

November 11, 1855 (2) Lecompton constitut i on of
November 7, 1857 (3) Leavenworth const itut ion of April 3,
18 58 and the (4) Wyandotte c onstitution of July 29 , 1859 .

The Lecompton constitut ion was , drawn up b., the pr6-sla.very
group and the other constitutions by the free-state people .
All four documents were submi tted to Congr ess , but onl y
the Wyandotte received the necessary a pproval, and that
only after a number of southern members had l eft the Senate
in the secession movement.
Bills of Rights we r e prominent parts of ea ch of these
territori al constituti ons. 1

Article I of the Topeka con-

stitution set forth a Bill of Rights of Twenty-two sections
1.

Frank W. Blackmar, Kansas,! Cyclopedi a of State
History. Vol. I, p. 415-22

1..4

which contained subst antially the same guarante es as
were later incorporated into the Wyandott e constitution.
The Lecompton constitution concluded with a Bill of Rights
which varied little from the Topeka constitution except
for section 23 which read,

"Free negroes shall not be

permitted to live in this state under any circumstances".
The Bill of Rights in the Leavenworth constitution was
largely a repetition of that of the Topeka constitution .
Ohio Constitution as Source for Kansas Bill of Rights
The Wyandotte constitution was mo deled after the
Ohio Constitution of 1851.

Twelve of the fift y-two mem-

bers at the Wyandotte convention in 1859 were from the
st ate of Ohio and they naturally favored the use of their
native sta t e document as a pattern for t heir work 2 • The
Ohio Bill of Rights in the constitution of 1851 was copied
from the earlier Ohio constitution of 1802 a.nd this in
turn was patterned after the provisions in constitutions
of Kentucky and New York .

Bills of Ri ghts in these early

constitutions and charters which in turn pat terned after
civil liberties as provided in English documents and
Common Law.

Thus, our own present day Bill of Ri hts can

be traced back to the early _rights of Englishmen.
Study of the Bills of Rights in the Kansas and the
Ohio constitutions shows that much was t aken verb atim from
the Ohio document.
2.

Out of the twenty sections in our Bill

W. G. Cutler, History of the State of Kansas.

p. 174.
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of rights, four sections are copied verbatim from
Ohio;

five sections are altered by only t wo or thr ee

words; and nine other sections are similar.
a section forbid ding s:uspensi on of l aws

Ohio h as

h i ch Kans a s

did not adopt, and Kansas h as added a s ection defi ning
treason and a secti on giving aliens the s ame p rop er t y
rights a s citizens.(In 1888 the l att er Kan sas section
was amended)
The Kans a s Bill of Ri ghts
The Bill of Ri ghts i n our present s t ate cons titution
consists of the following t wenty s ections: 3

BILL OF RIGHTS
1. Equal ri ghts. All men ar e po ss s sed of
equal and inalienable natural ri ght s , among
which are life , liberty , and the pursuit of
happiness.
2. Political power; privileges . All political power is inherent in t he people, an d al l free
governments are founded on t heir authori t y , and
a.re instituted for their equa l pr ote ct i on and
benefit. No special privileges or immunit ies
sh all ever be grante d by t he legi slat ur e, which
may not be altered , revoked or repea led by t h e
same body; and this power shall be exer cis ed by
no other tribunal or a gency.
3. Petition, etc. The people have the ri ght
to assemble, in a peaceable manner, to consult
for their common good, to instruct their repr esentatives, and to petition the gover nment, or
any depa rtment thereof,. for the redres s of
grievances.
3. I. L. Iles, The Government .£f. Kansa s. pp. 65-67.
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4. Bear Arms; armies. The people have t h e
ri ght to be ararIDs f or their defens e and s ecurity ;
but standing ar mies , in time of pe a ce, ar e dangerous to liberty, and s hall not b e t olerat ed , and
the mi iliit ary sh all be in strict su bor dina t ion to
t he civil power.
5. Tri al .!?.I .J.Err. The r i ght of tri al by
jury sha ll b e inviolat e.
6. Slave r y prohi b ite d. There s hall b e no
slave r y i n this s t ate ; and n o i nvolunt ary servitude, ex cept for t he punis hment of cr i me , whereof
the party shall hav e been dul y convic ted .
7. Re lig ious liberty. The r i ght to worsh ip
Go d a ccordi ng to t he dicta te s of consc ienc e shall
never be infr inged ; nor s hall a ny per son be compelled to att end or support any form of wors hip;
nor sha ll any cont r ol of or i nt er f er ence with the
r i ghts of conscience be p ermit te d, nor· any pr e f er ence given by l aw t o a ny re l i gi ous est abl i shment
or mode of worship. No religi ous test or prop erty
qualification shall be r equired for any offi c e of
public t r ust, nor f or any vote a t any e l e c t i on ,
nor shall any p erson be incomp et ent to t e sti fy
on a ccount of r eligious b elief.
8 . Habea s corpus. The r i ght t o th e writ of
habeas corpus shall not be s u spended , unl ess the
public s af ety r equ ires i t in c ase of i nvas ion or
reb ellion.
9. Bail. All person s shall be a a ila.ble by
suffici~sureties exc ept for capi tal off ense ~,
where proof is evident or t he pres umption gr eat .
Excessiv e b a il a.hall not be requ ired , nor exc e s s iv e fine s i mp os ed, nor cr u el or unusua l punishment inflicted .
10 . Trial; def ense of a ccus ed. I n al l pros e cutions, the a ccus ed s ha.11 be allowe d to appear
and defend in person, or by counse l ; t o demand
the nature and caus e of t h e a ccusati on a gainst him;
to meet the v itness f a ce to f a ce, and to hav e
compulsory process to compel t he at t endan c e of
witnes ses in his behalf, and a sp e e dy t ri a l by an
impartial jury of th e county or distr ict i n vhich
the offense is alle ged to have been c ommi t t ed .

l?
No person shall be a witness against himself, or
be t wice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
11. The Press; libel. The liberty of the pre ss
s hall be inviolate; and a ll persons may freely
speak, wr ite or publish their s entiment s on a ll
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of such
right; and in all civil or criminal actions for
libel, the truth may be g iven in evidence to the
jury, and if it shall appear that the alleged
libelous matter was published for justifiable
ends, t he ac cused party shall be acquitted.
12. No person transported. etc. No person
shall betransported from the stat e for any
offense committed within the s ame, and no conviction within the state shall work a corruption
of blood or a forfeiture of estate .
13. Treason . Treason shall consist only of
levying war against the state, adhering to its
enemies, or giving t hem aid and comf ort. No
person sha ll be convicted of treaso n unl ess on the
evidence of two witnesses to t he overt act, or
confession in open court.
14. Soldiers. No soldier sha ll, i n time of
peace, be quartered in any house vli thout t he consent of the occupant, nor in time o war , except as
presc r ibed by law.

15. Search and seizure. The ri ght of the
people to be secure in t heir p ersons and propert y
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall
be inviolat e; and no warrant shall iss ue but on
probable ·cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing theplace to be searched
and the pe r sons or property to be sei ze d .
16. Imprisonment for debt. No person shall be
imprisoned for debt, except in cases of fraud.
l?. Pro~erty rights of citizens and a liens.
No distinction shall ever be made between citizens
of the st ate of Kansas and the citizens of other
states and territories of the United States in
reference to the purchases, enjoyment or descent
of property. The rights of aliens in reference
to the purchase, enjoyment or descent of prop erty
may be r egulated by law. (Note--this section was
submitted to and adopted by the peop le at the
election held in 1888 . The original section l?
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was as follows: "No distinct ion shall ever
be:unade between citi zens a nd a liens in ref erence t o the purchase, en j oyme nt or descent of
property" .
18. Justice without delay. All persons ,
for injurie s s uff er ed in person, reput ation,
or property, shall have r emedy by due c ourse
of law, a n cl justice administrated ·ithout delay.
19. Emolument s , et c. No hereditary
emoluments, honors , or privilege s sh all ever
be granted or conferred by thi s state .
20 . Powers no t delegated. Th i s enumeration
of rights shall not be construe d t o i mpair or
deny others r et ained by the peopl e ; and all
power s not herein dele gat ed remain with the
pe op le.
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CHAPTER IV
PETITION; A."RMS ;

WORSHIP ;

PRESS ; EMOLUMENTS

This chapter i ncludes sect ions 3 , 4 , 7, 11, and 19
of the Bill of Rights.

Secti on 19 , prohib iti ng the con-

ferring of her edit ary emo l uments by the state , has never
been involved in any case before the Supreme Court .
Sectian 4, deali ng with the ri ght to bear arms , has been
directly involved on only one occasion, that i n 1905. In
t wo clear cases sec tio n 3 , grant ing the r i ght to assemblage and petition, has been before the Court .

Sections

7 and 11, providing freedom of worshi p and freedom of
speech and press, have been invol ved i n numerous cases,
severa l of which hav e been r ather rec ently before the
court.
Section 3. of t he Bill of Ri ghts:
The people have the ri ght to assemble, i n a
peaceable manner, t o consult for t he ir common
good, to i nstruct their repr esent atives , a nd t o
petition the goTermaent, or any depart ment thereof,
for the redress of grieva nces.
In the ca se of Flynn~- Brotherhood .2.f. Railroad
Trainmen lllK. 415. (1922), the defendent was dropp ed
from a trainmen's beneficiary organization bec ause he had
violated one of its by-laws in petitioning di re ctly
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to the district superint endent r ather than through the
organiza tion.

Later,' af ter F lynn's death, his wi dow

sued for benefits f rom the organization on the grounds
that for them to drop Flynn fr om membership f or his act
was a violation of his ri ght to petition as provided in
the Bill of Ri ghts.

The Court held that there wa s no

viola tion of constitutional r i ghts , that Fl ynn coul d
elect to_ belong to the organiz ation, and that after such
free choice he was bound to ab i de by the regulations of
the organization_or resign.
In the ca s e of State~· Board of Education 122K.
701.(1927), a ci ty school distric t after a long struggle
succ~eded in getting a statute passed by the legis l atur e
which enabled the district _to annex out l y ing districts
upon favorable vote of a ma jority of t he re s idents therein.

The minority ·in s uch out l ying di ~tricts ch arg ed

that the city school district consp ired i n influencing
the legislature.

The court he l d that the city school

board or any group has the right to assemble and to
petition and mi ght le gally seek relief by using such
measur es to infiliuence legi s l ature.
Section!• of the Bill of Ri ghts:
The people have the right to bear arrns f or their
defense and security; but standing armies, in time
of peace, are dangerous t o libert y , and shal l not be
tolerated, and the military shall be in strict subordination to the civil power.
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In the case of City of Salina. y_. , Blaksley 72K.
230 (1905), the Court h eld that th is se ct ion is a limitation on the l~gislative power to e nac t l aws prohibiting
the bearing of arms in the militia or any other military
organization provided by l aw , but is not a limi tation on
the legislative power to enact l aws prohi b i t ing and
punishing the promiscuous carrying of arms or other deadly
weapons?

The s ection is held t o de a l exclusively wi th

the milit ary ;
Section

individual rights are not considered.

:z..

of t he Bill of Rights:

The right to worship God a ccording t o the
dict ates of consci ence shall never be infringed ;
nor shall any person be compelled to attend o~
support any form of worship; nor shall any cont r ol or int erference with the rights of conscience
be permitted, nor any pref erence given by law to
any reli gious es t a.b lisbment or m de of worship .
No relig ious test or property qualifi cation shall
be re quired for any office of public t rust , nor
for any vote at any election, nor shall any per son be incompetent to testify on account of
religious b elief.
4

In the case of State v. Blair 130K. 863 . (1930),
Blair was convicted of violation of the Sunday Labor
law by opera.ting a t heatre on Sunday .

Blair charged that

he was being deprived of his right to religious freedom
by being comp~lled to accep t Sunday as a day of r est.
The Court h eld that his rights were not violated and his
religion ·was not interf erred with.
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In St ate !.• Raining _1 31K. 853 ( 1930 ), the same theatre was operat ed on Sunday by a bona fide Seventh Day
Adventist.

Upon arrest, the defendant char ged t hat h is

religious ri ghts were violated since Sunday was not the
Sabbath Day for him.

The court held t hat refusing him

the ri ght t o operat e the theatre on Sunday had nothing
to do with his religion and t hat such prohibition was a
proper exercise of police power t o protect the mor als of
the general public.
In Feizel y. First German Soc. M,.

E• Church 9K. 592

(1872 ), the trustees, to meet stipulations of a trust,
closed the church to a cert a in minister not a cceptable
as provided in the trust.

The Court held that it would

sit in equity to see that stipulations of the turst were
carried out, and that if such stipulat i ons were objectionabme to the members of the congregation, they were fr ee
to go elsewhere to worship.

Since the members were not

compelled to worship in the church established by t he
trust, their rights were not infringed.

The Courts will

not int erfere with worship beyond carrying out the trust.
In Haclmey y. Vawter 39K. 615 (1888 ), the Court
held that an injunction may be granted to rest ra in the
minority from infringing upon the rights a nd beliefs of
the majority within a given church.

In this c ase the

new minister and a minority of t he church officers sought
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to force music upon the congregation in the f orm of an
organ and group singing .

Such music and f orm of

rorship

was against the extablished principles of t he church
and violated the ~i ghts of the ma jority.
In Anderson y. City of Wellington 40K. 173 (1888 ),
the Court held that a city ordinance requiring the
authority of the mayor f or street demons trat ions was
void and that any r eligious group may parade streets or
draw crowds together so long as such a ctions do not
thr ea t en t he public pea ce or good order of the community .
In Billard.!• Emard.£! Educ a tion 69K. 53 (1904),
the Court held t hat a public school t ea cher who , for
the purpose of quieting t he pupils and preparing t h em
for the regular studies, rep eats t he Lord's Prayer and
the Twenty-third Psalm a s a mo rning exer cise, without
comrnent or remark , in which a ll pupils are not required
to participa te, (but were required to rema i n quiet and
orderly) is not conduct i ng a f orm of religi ous wor s hip
or teaching sectarian doctrine.
In Denton .Y.• Jones 107K. 729 (1920), t wo gr andmothers, one a Roman Catholic and the other a Prot e sta nt ,
were disputing over the custody of a gr anddaughter.

The

Court held th at aside f r om te a chings su bver s i ve of
morality and decency , and some ot hers e qually obnoxious,
the courts have no auth or i t y over t hat part of a child's
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training wh ich consists of r eligious discipline, and
in a dispute relating to custody , religious views
afford no ground for depriving a parent of custody who
is otherwise qualified.
In St ate y_. Monahan ?2K.492 (1905), t he Court held
that provisions of the Kansas Bill of Rights that no
property qualification shall be requir ed for any offi ce
of public trust or f or any v ote at any ele ction , applies
only to t hose offices and elec t ions co ntemplated by the
constitut ion, an d does not prevent the legisla ture from
authorizing t he creation of drainage district s , the
powers of which are t o be exercised by dire ctors who a.re
required to b e freeholders elected b y the res ident taxp ayers.

A dr ainage dist r ict i s who _ly the c r e ation of

t he legis lature which has disc retion in providing for
its officers.
Section il. of t he Bill of Righ t s:
The libe r t y of the press shal l be inviolate; and
a ll persons may freely speak , wr i te or publish their
sentiments on all subjects, being responsibl e for
the abuse of such ri ght; and in all civil or c~i minal
actions for libel, t he truth may b e given in evidence
to the jury, and if it shall appe ar that the alleged
libelous matter was published f or justifi able ends,
the accused party shall be acquitted.
In Castle!• Houston 19K. 417.(187 7), a distinction
is made between t he defense in criminal and in civil libel.
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The Court held that i n all criminal pros ecutions for
libel, the truth of the matter charged as libelous is
not a full and complete defe nse unl ess it appear s that
the matter charged wa s published for public benefit ;
or in other words, that the alleged libelous matter
was published f or justif iable works; but in all such
procee dings , the jury, after having re ceived the direction of the court , shall have t he r i ght to determine,
at t heir discretion, the law and th e fa ct .

In all

civil actions for libel, brought by the part y claiming
to h ave been defamed , wh er e the defendant al leges and
estab lishes the truth of the matter charged as defamatory, such de f endant is justif ied in l aw and exempt
f rom civil respons ibility.

In such ca.ses the :g.ury

must receive and a ccept the directi on of the court as
the l aw.

The cour t justif ied such distinction on

grounds that wnere a publi cation is made s olely t o
disturb the harmony and happiness of society or t o
maliciously annoy and injure others or to cr eate mi s ery-the interests of the public requiresome prevent a t i ve
notwiths tanding the truth of t he publication .
In Hetherington v. Sterry 28K. 173 (1882),

the

Court held that it is not necessarily a defense to an
a ction of libel that every act charged i n the alleged
libelous article might be done without the violation
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of any law.

I t is enough if the acts charged are auch

as are calcul ate d to render the party in the judgment
of his fellows infamous, odious , or ridiculous.

Here

an article exposing a lawyer as one who deserts his client
in the mi dst of a c as e is proper grounds f or libel.
In Mundy

I• Wight 26K. 173 (1881), the Court held

that the truth is a full defense in any civil a ction
for slander, as well as for libel.
In State

I• Mayberry 33K. 441 (1885), the Court

held that in order th at an article published in a news paper should be held to be libelous as t o a particular
person, it is necessary that the language of the article
should be such that any pe r sons seeing it should , in
the light of surrounding cir cumst ances, be able to
unde r stand that it referred to such person.
In Railway Co.~. Brown BOK. 312 (1909), the Court
held that a st ature which requires an employer of labor,
upon request of a discharged employee, to furnish in
writing the t rue cause or reason f or such discharge is
not a police regulation a.nd is an interference with the
pe r sonal liberty guarnteed in the Bill of Rights .

An

employer may disc harge his employe e for any or f or no
reason, so long as no contract agre ements are violated.
In Lewis

I•

Publishing

.92.. lllK.25? (19 22 ), during

war with Germany ( 1918.) , the defendant published in

2!1

his newspaper an article mentioning the plaintif f's
futule effort to procure deferred classifi cation and
s tat ed how the plaintiff had wi th the help of a friend
gotten off the t rain enroute to a military training
camp and then later made contradictory statement s to
the loc al draft board in explaining the indident.

The

Court held that here was proper grounds for an a ction
in libel sunce such publication did defame the plaintiff and cause his friends to refer to him as a
sl acker.
In State.!• Fiske ll?k. 69 (1924), the defendant
charged with securing members for an organization,
The Industrial Worl<:ers of the World, advocating clas s
war between labor and capital.

The defendant was con-

victed of felony, according to statute, and he charged
violation of his constitutional r i ghts .

The Court

held that const i tional guarantees of freedom of speech
are not violated by a statute penali zing the adva cacy
of violence in bringing about government al change.
In State.!• Freeman 143K. 315 (1936 ), the statute
prohibiting anonymouns public ation criticizing politic a l
candidates was held valid.

The defendant was brought

to court because of a poster whi ch charged his opponent
for county com..missioner with f raud and bor e the s i gnature "friends of R. E. Freeman."

The defendant declared

that his rights were infringed and t he Bill of Rig hts
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violated by the statute under whi ch he was arrested.
The Court held that there is nothing in the s t atute
which prevents in the slightest degree any person from
exercising a ll his constitutional rights to write or
print i nformation conc erning a cand idate.

The statute

simply requires that responsib i lity f or such inf ormation
be indicated.

The s tatute does not deny lib erty-- it

requires only assumption of the responsibility of liberty.
In Eckert v. Van Pelt 6 9K. 3 57 (1904), the Court
held that v,r i t ten words are a ctionable per~ (of themselves) i f they t end to render him of wh om t hey are
written contempt ible or didiculous.

A

newspaper pub-

lication s t at ing that a man is a "eunu h" is a ctionable

per M,

and

the libele d person's name need not be men-

tioned where it is evident that the statement refers t o
him.
In State y_. Herry ~6K. 416 (1887), the Court held
t hat a statute pl afng upon t h e defendant in a prosecution for l i bel the burden of s howing the the pub lication of the alleged libel was made with good motives
before there can be an acquittal violates the Bill of
Rights which calls for only justificable ends.

Good

motices are not a prerequisite to justification and
acquittal.
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In Cooper .Y.• Seaverns 81K. 267 (1909), the Court
held that th e rule of the Common Law, that s poken words
imputing unchastity t o a femal e are not actionable
without allegati on and proof of special damages , is
not a part of the law of thi s state and is not in keeping with th e spirit of the l aw at the t ime.

Words that

bla cken a woman's reputation are a ct i onable per~.
In Coleman .Y.• MacLennan 78K. 711 {1908), the publisher of a newspaper circulated throughout t he stat e
published an art icle r eciting fa cts and ma ldng comments
relat i ng to the offi ci al conduc t and cha racter of a
st ate offi cer, who was a candidate fo r eelection.

The

Court held that where such a ction is f or t he sole purposeof enabling the vot er s to cast their ballo ts more
intelligently, and the whole thing is done in gooa.
faith, the public at ion is privilege d , al though the
matters contained in the article are false and are der ogatory to the character of the candidate .

In t his

cas e the edi t or had in mind the common good rather than
malice to the candi dat e and was "just if ied" in making
such publication.
I n Knapp .Y.• Green 1 23K. 550 (1927), t h e Court
held that an article published i n a newspaper concerning a person named or described t herein whi ch t ends t o
provoke him to wrath, or expose him t o :public hatr ed,
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contempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public oonfidence and social inter·ro urse is
a ctionab le per~ if the art icle is f alse.

In this

case the article charged a postmast er and Republican
boss of stopping at nothing to maintain control by
their ma.chine.
In Depew !.• Wi chita Association £f. Credit Men
142K. 403 (1935), where a group of credit men who are
are not licensed lawyers were giving legal advice to
clients, and the court held that t o prohibit such practi ce was not t o depri ce the credit men of t heir free dom
of speech.

Such regulation wa s proper use of the police

power f or protection of t he general public .
Section ..!2_.

of t he Bill of Ri ghts:

No heredit ary , emoluments, honors, or privileges
shall ever be granted or conferred by t h e stat e.
This section has n ever been dir ectly involved in
any cas e before the Court.

There have been many ca ses

in which ch arg es of di scrimination and speci al privileges
have been made, but t hese cases come unde r sections 1
and 2 of the Bill of Rights and a.re listed in Chapter V.
SUMivlARY

In summary of the f oregoing cases it may be st ated
that the Supreme Court of the state of Kansas has held
its citizens to the following principles:
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1.

If one is a member of an organizationlf. he

must abide by the rules of that organization,
even though such rules prohibit certain rights
of p etition.
2.

(111K. 415)

One has a ri ght to assemble and t o petition

the legis latur e fo r desired legislation, though
such legislation b e bitterly opp osed by others .
(122K. '701)
3.

The state has a right to ena ct l aws prohibi t -

i ng and ·p unishing t he promi scuous c arrying of
a r ms.
4.

('72K. 230)

One may be restrai. ned from operating a theatre

on Sunday and his religious f re edom i.s not viol ated.
5.

(130K. 863)

Property left in trust for religious purposes

must be used as s t ipul a ted in the trust .
6.

(9K. 592 )

An injunction may be pr operl y granted to re-

strain a mi norit y fr om infringing upon the beliefs
of the ma jority within a given church.
'7.

(39K. 615)

One may demonstrate and parade in :publi c with-

out authority f rom city offi c i als, so long as the
public peace and good order are threatened.
(40K. 1?3)

8.

A teacher may r ead to here pupils the Lord's

Pra:1rer and the Twenty-third Psalm without c omment
or remark.

( 69K. 53)
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9.

The courts have no a uthority over that part

of a child's training which consists of relig ious
discipline.
10.

(107K. 720)

Property qualifications may be requir ed for

directors and for electors in drainage districts .
(72K. 492)
.1 1.

The truth of the matter charged a s l i belous

is a f ull and comp l ete de t ense in civil livel but
not in criminal libel.
12.

(1 9K . 417)

That every act charge d in an alleged libelous

article might be done without viola tion of any
law, is not necessarily a def ense to an a.ctoin
in libel.
14.

(28K. 174 )

The truth is a full defense in any civil

action fo r slander.
15.

(26K. 173)

For an article to be held libelous is a

particular person, it must b e cle ar th at the article refers to him.
16.

(33K. 441)

To require an employer to g ive in writ ing ,

upon request of a discharged emp loye e, the reas on
f or the discharge i s a violation of the employer's
rights.
l?.

(BOK. 312)

Making remarks which would c ause a person t o

be called, in time of war, a slack er, is grounds
f or libel.

(lllK. 257)
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CHAPI'ER V

EQUAL RIGHTS ; POLITICAL POWER; POWERS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE
This chapter includes sections 1, 2, and 20 of the
Bill of Rights.

Sections 1 and 2 , providing for equal

rights and prohibiting discrimination,

have been subj ects

for much litigation before the Supreme Court.

The s e t wo

sections are so closely related t hat many s i ngle cases
have been carried to the Court on t h e grounds t hat both
sections are violated.

That the s e s ecti ons ,provide a

lasting basis for litigation i s evi dent in that eighteen
cases, directly involving either or both s e·c tions , have
been before t h e Supreme Court s i n~e 1930.

Secti on 20 ,

reserving to the people al l powe r s not delegat ed , has
been directly involved in fiv e cl ear- cut cases and has
been mentioned i n numerou s oth ers .
Section

1·

of t h e Bi ll of Ri ght s :

"all men are p os s essed of equal and
ina lienable n atural rights, among whi ch are
life, lib erty, and the pur suit of happiness . "
In Atchi s on Street RailWsY Co. y. Mo. Pac. Railway
Co. 31K. 660 (1884), the Court held t hat the city of
Atchison did not violate the Bill of rights in granting
special privilege to a street rai lway company to permit
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such company- to occupy the streets with its tracks.
The legislature ha s power to authorize municipal
coporations to issue franchises granting privileges.
In Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fey. Mathews
58K. 447(1897), the Court held that a statute providing that a plaintiff might collect attorney's
fees, in addition to fire damages, from a railroad
company, was in the nature of a police regula tion
desinged to enforce care on the part of the railroad
and was not intended to place a burden on railroad
corporations that private persons are not required to
bea~.
In Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fey. Clark 60K.
826 (1899), the Court held t hat a special fire tax
levied on railroad property for the exclusive benefit
of other property was discrimination against one taxpayer in favor of another and was a denial of equal
protection of the law.
In Cit.y of Topeka~- Raynor 61K.10 (1900 ), the
Court held that an ordinance providi ng , "All plac es
where persons are permitted to resort for the purpose
of drinking intoxicating liquors as a beverage are
common nuisances" is not repugna.Jbt to the constitutional provision that all mena are possessed of equal
and inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty,
and the pursuit of happiness.
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In City of Leavenworth y. Water Co. 62K.643
(1901), a water company complained that a statute
forcing it to file itemized statements of income and
expense accounts with the city clerk was an unjustifiable scrutiny of private affairs.

The Court held

that the corporation was formed for public service and
might be con trolled by the state in the interest of the
public vm ich it agreed to serve.

The company had no

vested ri ght to withhold from the public information a s
to its operations under the very franchise which the
public bad conferred upon it.
In State y. Wilcox 64K. 789 (1902 ), the defnedent
was convicted of practicing medicine without a license,
and he answered with the charg e that such action operated
to exclude some persons from following their chosen
professions and was arbitrary discrimination.

The court

held that such law was proper to prote ct the people from
ignorance and incapacity, as well as from deception and
fraud, and was proper use of police p ower of the state.
In Bijick Co. y. Perry 69K . 297(1904), the court held
that a statute forbiddipg discharge of an employee for
joining a labor union was unconstitutional as a violation
of the protection of life, liberty, and proper t y .

One

citizen can not be compelled to employ another anymore
than one can be compelled to work for another against his
will.
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In Ratcliff y. Stockyards Co. 74K.1(1906), the
stockyards company charged tr..at a statute regulating
their handling r ates deprived them of their right to
make contra cts as they chose and amounted to taking
of their property .

Court held that rates fixed by

statute were reasonable and that leg islature has power
to fix su ch rates for a public-service corpora tion so
long as such rates are not so unreasonable as to destroy
the value of; tpe- property.
In Schaake y. Dolley 85K .598 (1911), the State
Charter Board , acting under statute, refused to cha rter a
fifth bank for the city of Abilene and the pla intiff
charged violation of equal rights.

The Court held that

while the choosing of an occupat ion is considered an
inali enable r i ght , it is not absolute, and it is prop er for
t he sovereign p ower to interfere if t h a t right becomes
detrimental t o the common g ood.

Banking is a business in-

timately related to the publi c welfare and properly comes
under the police power.

In this case the State Charter

Board f elt t hat there was not business to justify a fifth
bank in the city and such bank would have weakened all .
In State y . Coppage

87K. 752 (1912), the_ Court r e-

verse d its philosophy as expounded eight years earli er .in
69K.297, and held tha t an emp loyer has no right to dominate life or int erfere with the lib erty of the employee
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in matters that do not lessen or deteriorate such
employee's service.

A man mi ght be f i red for drinking

but not for re lig ion or f or l ab or union membership .(This
decision was rever sed in 236

u. s .

1)

In Stat e y. Cline 91K .416 (1914 ), the state i nheritance tax was challenged as a violation of equal p rotection
and benefit of t he people.

The Court h eld tha t the in-

heritance tax was a tax on ~ne succession rather than on
~he property and that the right to ~ake prop erty by ctevise
or ctescent is the creat~re of the law,
right.

and not a natural

The authority that confers the privilege of inheri-

tance may impose conditions and may dis criminate between
relatives.
In State y. Reaser 93K.628 .( 1915), the superintendent
of a coal mining company was convicted of failure to provide
proper bathing facilities for employees, as required by
law.

Defenden t charged discriminat i on since other mines

(zinc, salt, lead, etc.)
tions.

did not have to meet the regula-

The Court held that the law applied toall mines

of a designated class and was n ot a violation of the Bill
of Rights because not applicable to other classes of rrutnes .
In Drainage -District y. Mo. Pac. Railroad 99K.188 .
(1916), a drainage district ordered a r ailroad bridge
destroy~d as a flood hazard.

The Court held that such an

order was con stitutional so long a s it was reasonable,
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and that here it was done to p rotect the lires and
homes of the people.

The grant of p ower to the board

was never interp reted a s a p rivilege to injure the
public.
In State y. Wilson lOlK.789.(1917), the Court held
that under its police power the state may place a prohibitory tax on an occupation whi ch is de emed injurious
or offensive to t he public, and the use of trading stamp s
is de ceptive and objectional enough to be p rohibited by
heavy tax.
In In re Josie Dunkerton 104K.481.(1919 ) , the
petitioner charged that a statute providing that the
board of Admi nistration mi ght p arole women aged 18 to
to 25, but that older ones mus t

erve the minimum term

in the State Industrial Farm, denied equal prot ecti on
of the law to women over 25 ye ars of age .

The Court

held that statute was constitutional; t hat even though
the Board of Administration could not parole older women,
the district court still might do so; and that the legislature had a right to make a difference i n the treatment
of different classes of cr iminal s.
In Chamberlain y. Mo. Pac. Railroad 107K.341(1920) ,
action was brought to comp el a railroad company to construct, at its own expense, a private c-rmssing on property
through which it had years before bought and paid for a
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right-of-way.

The Court held that such compulsion

was discrimination against the railroad and deprived
it of it s property without compensation.

The railroad

company could have been compelled to construct a public
but not a private one~
In City of Wichita y:. Walkow llOK.127. (1921), the
Court held t hat for the sake of enforcement of criminal
law and protection of the public in g eneral , it was proper, under the police power, for a city to pass an
ordinance requiring pawndealers to keep records, signatures, and fingerprints of those selling article s to
them.

Such ordinance did not deny equal protection of

the l aw.
In Ra ilroad and Light Co. v . Court of Industrial
Relations 113K. 217 (1923), the Court held tha t t he state
may intrude wi th p olic e p ower to abrogate existing contracts.

Contra cts co r_c erni ng rates for electric energy

to be supplied by an electric power company to a street
railroad are sub je ct to impairment or nullification under
an order of the public utilitie s commission when the
performance of those contracts at the agreed scedules of
rates so materially diminish or adversely affect the
revenues of the p ower company that the other cu stomers
of the power com pany have to bear some portion of the
burden resulting from such contracts, or are otherwis e
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discriminated against on account of such contra cts.
In ~ayfield y. Board gf Educ a tion of Salina 118K.
138 (1925), the defendents charged that the erection of
a school house next to their property would depreciate
the value thereof because of the added noise, tresp asses,
etc., and that they would thus be injured without any
compensation and wo uld be denied equal protection of the
law.

The Court held that acts done on prop er exercise

of governmental powers, not directly encroaching up on
private property, although their cons equences may i mpair
its use, do. not constitute a taking of prop erty and do
not entitle the o~mer to comp ensation under the Bill of
Rights.
In In re Casebier 129K.853 . (1930), the p etitioner
charged that a statute providing for the disburs ement
of lawyers convict.ed of felony or mis.demeanor i nvolving
moral turpitude wa s discrimina ting since the l aw brings
upon an attorney cons equ ences wh ich apply to no other
citizen, not even to other prof es s ional men.

Court hel d

that the right to practice law was not a p roperty right,
but a privileg e conferred by the state and t hat t he
statute simply took away t h is privileg e which other individuals did not even possess and did not vi~ia te equal
protection of the law.
In Capital Gas and Electric Co.

v.

Boynton 137K.717(1933 )
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the Court held that the statute prohibiting public
utilities companies from selling appliances was unconstitutional.

With no feature of public welfare a ctua lly

involved, the deprivation of the utilities companies of
an implied power and privilege :incidental to their g enw ,

eral business was unreasonable, arbitral"Y, and oppre s sive,
and deprived this p articular class of equal protection of
the law.
In Smithy. Steinrauf 140K.407(1934), the Court h eld
that the interest of an owner in cats kep t in his r esid ence
for pleasure is a property interest, n ot base nor i mperfect nor qualified, but a complete and absolute property
interest, and that an ordinance limiting the number of
cats which an owner may keep in his residence to f ive,
without regard to distinctiveness of character of t he
animais, to purpose, or to manner and consequ ences of
keeping, is void.

A p erson may enjoy p rivate p rop erty so

long as it doesn't detract from the general welfare.
In State y. Wyandotte Co. Commissioners

140K.744

(1934), the Court held that the Kansas statute, ap plicable only to Wyandotte County, authorizing the calling
of an annual grand jury with special costs taxed against
persons convicted on indictments found by such grand jury,
violates the equal protection clause of the constitution.
Such act discriminated against those convicted of crimes
in Wyandotte county.
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-~ In Ash v. Gibs on 145K. 825 . ( 1937), the defendent
protested that his right to equal protection of the
law was violated by a city ordinance forbiding oil
transport trucks of over 600 gallon capacity to use
eertain streets.

The Court held that such oil trucks

had no inherent right to use the streets, that such
transports could use other streets of the city , and
that because of the potential danger of fire from
collision the regulation was proper under p olice p ower.
In Brown y. City of Topeka 146K. 974.(1938), a
group of Topeka property owners prot ested agai m t changing the name of a street , claiming that they had a
v ested property right in the na me of the street, of
which the ordinance g iving power to change deprived t hem
without due process and comp ensation.

Th e Court h eld

that the name of a street is not a property right and
that there was no peprivation.
In Johnson v. Reno Co. Commissioners 147K.211 (1938 ),
the Court held that denial by the township boa rd of a
license fvr sale of 3. 2 beer does not vio late the Bi l l
of Rights.

such denial of a license is not a denia l of

life, liberty, or pursuit of happiness.

Application for

a license is a reque st f or a privilege under a regulatory police measure and is not a right.
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In Hushaw y. Kansas Farmers Union Roya lity Co.
149K.64(1939), the Court held tha t a stature, p rovi ding
that instruments conveying mineral rights are void unless
recorded wi thin ninety days after execution and i f not
listed for t axati on, did not violate the Bill of Rig hts.
This was n o t the forfeiture of a v es t ed title, but a condition precedent to the vesting of title in the transferee.
In Kern y. Newton City Commi ss i oners 147K.471(1938) ,
the Court held th at the plaintiff

a colored citi zen and

tax-payer of Newto n , ha s the individual ri t ht to initiate
p roceedings in mandamus to compel the g overrui.ng off icials
of the city to admit him to privileges of the city ' s
swimming poot constructed by the municipality at public
expense.

The legislature alone can provide for segre-

gation of races.
In Carolene Products y. Mohler

152K . 4 .(1940) the

Carolene Products comp any charged that they were being
discriminated against by the Kansas "fi lled- milk" statute
which prohibited the sale of milk products contain~ng any
added element other than milk fat.

They p ointed out that

every ingredient in their product was sold in other forms
in the state.

Facts in the cas e showed that "Carolene"

was being bought by the public as genuine evaporated
milk, and the Court held that this afforded grounds for
prohibiting the product in the interests of the public.
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In Railroad Co. y. Public Utilities Commission
llSK.417(1934), the Court held that a statute which
subjected to taxation lands dedicated to public use
as a cenetery where the ovvnership of the land is
held by a corporation, while all other cemetery lands,
the title to which is held by an individual, are
exempted fuom taxation, violates the provisions of the
state constitution which guarantee equal protection of
the law.
In Hair y. City of Rumbolt l33K.C 67 (1931), the
plaintiff, ·vVho am...~ufactured bakery products at Iola and
sold them to the merchants in Rumbolt, ogjected to a
Rumbolt city ordinance which provided for a license of
$1 per day or $10 per y ear for p ersons operating bakeries
within the city and selling the products, and $1.50 per
day or $120 per year for persons selling bakery products
therein and not owning or operating a bakery and having
·no bona fide place of business within the city.

The court

held that such ordinance violated obth the federal and the
state constitution.
In Swope y. State 145K.928(1937), the Court held
that the refusal of an expert witness to testify in court
without extra compensation is proper grounds for contempt
of court and may be punished as such.

A physician may not

refuse to testify on grounds that his rights are being
violated.
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In Osborn y. Russell 64K.507(1902), the Court held
that a board of education, at a time vv.hen the disease
of smallpox does not exist in or near the city, has no
authority to deny a child of sen ool age , re sident there in, admission into the public schools because such child
has not been vaccinated.
In State,~ rel.,y. Jackson 139K.744(1934), the
Court held that a sheriff is properly removed from office
for beating and mistreating prisoners in violation of
their constitutional guarantees.

In State y. Sherow 87K. 235 (1912), the Court held
that a statute authorizing township boards to grant licenses for billard halls, poot halls, and bowling alleys
at their discretion is valid exercise of police power .

------

In In re Skinner 136K.879 (1933), the p etitioner
charg ed that judges were discriminating in discovering
past convictions and thus bringing defnedents under the
Kansas habitual criminal law.

It was contended that i n

some cases judges made little if any attempt to discover
past coDVictions and that defendents thereby escaped
the penalties of the law.

The Court held that the law

was constitutional and that so long as judges wer e not
willfully, arbitrarily, deliberately, and intentionally
depriving defendants of· equal protection of the law it
was within the Bill of Rights.
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I n Claflin ~· \l\ryandotte Co.81K . 57 (1909 ) , it was
hel d t ha t a statute pr ov iding that certa in public off·icers
shall not be entitled to witness fees in certa in cases ,
doe s not deprive the off icers of equal prote ction of the
law,

Such condition is a part of the p rivileg e accepted

with the public office and such condition may be swep t
away by resignation f r om office .

In Reynolds~ · Board of Education 66K. 672 (1903 ), i t
was held t h at a sta tute providi ng t hat bo ar ds of educa~
tion shall have power to org ani ze and mai ntain separate
schools for t he education of wh ite and colored ch ildr en
does not deny equa l prot ection of law.
In In~ Gardner 84K. 264 (1911), t he Court held tha t
the sta t ute providi ng that offi cers and men of the Kansas
National Gua rd sh all , when in per f ormance of mi l i tary
service , be transp ort ed on a l l r a ilroads of the stat e at
r educed r a tes denie s to r a ilr oad compani es l,he equal prote ction of the l aw.

In time of ext r eme emerg en cy and

peril , the r ai l r oads coul d even be sei zed by the state ,
but the a ct in questi on d oe s not spe cifi cal l y refer t o
such occ asions .
I n Wi nters ~ · Myers 92K. 414 (1914 ), it wa s hel d tha t
the titl e to is l ands forme d i n navig able streams s i nce the
admission of Kansas into th e Un i on i s held by the state
fo r the benefi t of all the people .

For t he leg islat ur e

to relinquish title to su ch islands to owners of shore l ands

-~

.

without compensatmon, where no public benefit will
result, is unconstitutional.

It is like compelling

a contribution from all for the benefit of the few and
here the equal rights clause is ca lled on to protect
the many f r om the few ir:stead of the usual v i ce versa.
In State y. Heitman 105K.139 (1919), the defendant
charged v i olation of equal protection of the law i n the
statute providing t hat a woman convicted of a mi s demeanor be sentenced to the state farm f or women f or an
undetermined period , with a maxi mum l imit, while a man
convicted of t he same misdemeanor is sentenced, under
the g eneral l aw , to the county jail f or a definite period
within the same maximum limit .

The Court held that there

is room for difference in t re atment of different classes
of crimina ls and that equal prote ction is secured if the
law op erate s in t he same way on all who belong to the
same cl a s s .
I n ~ y. City of Wichita 113K.153(1923), the
Court held that laws authorizing citi es to establish
districts or zon es within t h eir corporate limits and to
regulate the use of property and th e construction of
buildings therein, are not unconstitutional, but are proper us e of p olice p ower in the i nterest of the general
publ ic .
In Goodrich y. Mitchell 68K .765 (1904), the Court
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held that a statute g iving peeference to those who have
serv ed in the army and navy in appointment to off ice is
constitutional and not ynjust discrimination.

The Court

argued tha t these men because of exp erience and army
training may be co~sidered better fitted for public service than the g:eneral public .

In St ate y. Creditor 44K . 565(1890), the Court held
that a statute requiring regu lation and licensing of
dent istry was cons ti tutional~;_and proper use of police
for the common good .
In City of Cherokee y . Fox 34K. 16(1885), the Court
held that an ordinance providing license for professional
peddlers wa s not void for reason that is was class legisl ati on or discrimination .

The peddler could have sold

goods as a merchant of the city wi thru t paying such
l icense fee .
In State y . Mohler 98K . 465(1916), it was held that
a l aw requi r ing all c ommissi on merchants who sell farm
produce f or r esale t o hold a license issued by the State
Board of Agricu l t ure and to g ive bond to insure fair
dealing with t.heir cons i gnors, i s constitu-c,ional and is
not discriminatory.

It is prop er us e of police power

to protect a l a rge number of consignors ana the c~as s i fication is reasonable and broad.
In Balch y. Glenn 85K. 735 (1911), ~ne Court held

50
that a statute autnorizing the destruction of trees
in an attempt to exterminate San Jose scale ana other

orcnard pests ana charging of expense of such destruction
against U1e property is valid use of police power for
protection of the public welfare.
Section

g.

of the Bill of Rights:

"All political power is inherent in the people,
and all free governments are founded on their
authority, and are instituted for their equal
protection and benefit. No special privileges
or immunities shall ever be granted by the legislature, wh ich may not be altered, revoked or
repealed by the same b ody; and this power shall
be exercised by no other tribunal or agency."
In Water Co. y. City of Columbus 48K.99 (1892), the
Court held that authorities of a city coul~ bind their
successors by contracting for 21 years with a water company, and that such contract could be terminated or
changed only under the p olice p ower of the state .
In State y. City of Hutchinson 93K.405 (1914), the
Court held t hat the initiative and referendum law granted
no special privileges or immunities to those circulating
·and agitating petition.

Any citizen has an equal right

and opportunity to do the same.
In O'Neal y. Harrison 96K . 339 (1915), it was held
that a city may grant an exclusive right to the highest
bidder to remove all gar bage without v i ola tion of t he
Bill of Rights.

The last clause of section 2 was
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interpreted to refer solely to political prrvilege s
and not to privileges relating to prop erty rights.
Also the control of g arbage removal is proper exercise
of police power .
In State y. City of Wichita

lOOK.399 (1917), the

Court held tha t an a ct authorizing a city to adopt a
city manager plan is not a violation of section 2 of
the Bill of Ri ghts in that it is a delegation of legislative powers .
In Rohr v. City of Le avenworth lOlK. 222(1917), the
Court held that a statute giving to cities t he power to
pssess abutting property for repa ir of s treets as well
as for paving of streets is not a violat ion of the Bill
of Ri ghts.
In Jamison v. Flanner 116K.116 (1924 ), ~a sheriff
refused to r elea se a prisoner, pardoned by the Governor,
on the grounds tha t the Governor had f ai le d to comply
with the law by notifying the county attorney and the
district j udge and by publishing notice fo such pardon
30 days in advance.

The Court held that t he pardoning

power is not inherent in t h e executive, though it has
a long history; it is prop er for the legislature to
pass l aws regillating t h is power, and unless t he g overnor
meets t hese leg isla tive requirements the pardon or commutation is illegal.
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In Farmers Co-op G. ands . Co. y . Chicago, & L_
and]:. Railroad Co. 139K.677 (1934~,, the Court held that
a lease in effect between a railroad company and an elevator company

in which the elevator company comp l a ins

it is being char g ed hg igher rental than other similar
elevator companie s cannot be changed by the Public Service Commission acting for the state, unless such contract
is prejudicial to and discriminating ag ainst the public
or otherwise obstructs the state's authority to make l aws
and regulations reasonably n ecessary for the g eneral
welfare .
In Depew y. Wichita Association of Credit Men 142K.
403 (1935) , t t e Associ a tion was helpi ng cl i ents i n collection of debts and wa s off r ing what amount ed to leg al
advise and a id,
licensed l awyers .

though its members were not qualif ied or
The Court held that denial of such

privilege to the Associ ation was not vio l a t i on of the Bi ll
of Ri ghts.
In Lemons y Noller 144K. 813 (1936), statut es providing for absentee voting were cha r g ed to b e d iscrimi natory in that they made it p ossible for phy sic ally
disabled p ersons to vote who c ould not v ote were they
within the state.

Were the s e disabled voters within the

state it would be necess ar y for t h em to be pre s ent at
the polls in order to vote.

The Court held t hat voting
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is a privilege rather than a right and t hat t h e
legislature is nowhere in the constitution prohibited
from cla ssifying voters and t hat no one was herein deprived of his politic a l r i ghts .
In Winckler Oil Co. y. Anderson 104K.l (1919) ,
the court held that a statute making it unlawful to drill
or operate oil or gas wells with in 100 feet of t h e right
of way of steam or ele ctric railway lines do es not contravene provisions of the Bill of Ri ghts and i s proper
exercise of p olice p ower.
In Produce Co. y. City of Wichita 112K . 28 ( 1922) ,
it was he l d that a city ordinance levy i ng a license tax
on all trad~s, bus i nesses, and occupations in the city,
in which or incident to whoch del ivery Wagons or Trucks
are employed , is not ne cess ary voi d for ar bi t rariness
of classific ation or unl awful discrimi nation .

Truc ks

are nearly universal a ccessories to city trades , and
the ab ove cla ssificat ion is broad . No t ax or license can
be entirely equ al and perf ect.
In State y. Topeka 36K.76 (1886 ), t he Court held
tha t l abor is property, but i s not taken without compens a tion where a citizen is required to work on the s t ree ts.
Good ro ads and streets are sufficient compensation, ana
labor required in this case may be cons i dered a s an
assessment tax.
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Section 20. of ~h e Bill of Ri ghts:
"Thi s enumerati on of rights shal.l not be
construed to i mpair or deny others reta ined
by the people; and all p owers not herein delegated rema in with the people."
In Lemons~- Noller 144K. 813 (1936 ), i n which
the statutes providing t ·or absentee voting were
challeng ed a s being unconstitutional, the Court stated
that al.1 powers not delega t ed rema in wi-c,h _ue p eople
and since the people act through the leg islature , the
legislature may do whatever is not dire ctly or implicitly denied in the constitution.
In Coleman y. Newby ?K. 82 (1871), t h e plainti f f
appealed from a justice of the peace court to the di s trict court in the regular manner, except f or a ru.1e
adopted by the Supreme Court that notice in writing
·must be g iven of the appeal.

This rule was not an act

of the leg islatur e nor a rule of t he distri ct count
but it was a rule of the Supreme Court, ado ted by t he
Supreme Court for the g overnment of t he di str ict counts .
The plaintiff char g ed t hat the Supreme Court had no power
to make such a rule.

The Court held in t his c a se t hat

the leg isla ture can not delegate legi slative power to
the judiciary as was done her e .

The leg islat ure can

enact general provi s ions for the di s t ri ct courts and
allow t he district courts to use their discretion in
filling up details; but they can not enact g eneral
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provisions for the district courts an d authorize the
Supreme Court, or any other body or per s on, exc ept the
district courts to fill in the details.
In Wright y. Noell 16K. 601 (1876) , the pl a intiff
charged 1.,hat a woman was inelig ib le t o the office of
county superintendent in the state of Kans a s .

The

Court held that p owers of the -p eople are limited only
by abso lute justice and t he constitution , and t hat in
this case election of a woman to the above office
violat ed neither.

As the p eople, wi th re spect to

certain offices, h ave seen f it _by express constitutional
p rovisi ons to re s trict their f reedom of choice, it is a
fair infe ren ce that, where t he constitution is silent,
t h ey intended no restricti on .
In Ratcliff y. Stockyar ds 74K 1 (1906 , the Court
held tha t an a ct of t he leg i s l ature regul ati ng stoc kyards does not conflich with the constitution i n that
the p ower to

ass the a ct is not expre ssl y delegated t o

the leg islature .

The leg islature repr esents the people

of the state, and t here are no limits upon the · ower
which the p eop le may exercise, except such as may be
found in the constitution itself, or in the fed eral constitution.
In Johnson v. Reno County Commissioners 147K. 211
(1938), previously cited, the Court held t hat a s tatut e
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leaving to the discretion of the township board
the issuance of beer licenses within the tovmship
is not in viola tion of section 20 of the Bill of
Rights.

The leg istature i s not restricted by the

constitution in regul a tion of alcoholic b everages,
and no individual h a s any enforc eable right to a
permit to sell liquor.
Sill/ffitT.ARY
In summary of the foregoing cases it may be
stated that the Supreme Court of the St ate of Kansas
has held its citizens to the following principles:
1. Equal rights of citizens are not violated
when a city extends a franchise g ranting
special privileges. ( 31K. 660 )
2 . As a police regulation railroads may be
required to pay attorney's f ees of t hose
bringing suit against ehem. (58K. 447)
3. A special f ire tax may not be levied on
railroads for the exclu s ive b enefit of' others.
(60K. 826)
4 . All places where persons resort to drink may
properly .be considered common nuisances.( 61K. 10)
5. Public corporations can not withhold their
accounts and records from public officials.
(62K. 643 )
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6 . It is proper police regulation t o require
that physi cians shall be licensed . (64K. 789 )

7. In 1904 the Court held that an employee
c ould be disch arged for j oin i ng a labor union,
but in 1912 reversed itself and held to the
contrary .

(69K . 297 and 87K. 752)

8 . The state may fix rates for a stockya r ds

company . ('!4K. 1)
9 . The state may refuse to cha r t er an additi onal
bank in a city.

( 85K . 598 )

16. The state may discriminate bet ween r elative s

in i mposing an i nheritance tax. (91K. 4 16)
11. The state may p l ace regulat i ons on co al mi n es

from which other ki nds of mine s are exempt .
(93K . 628 )
1 2 . A drainage distriet board may order a r ai l r oad br idge destroyed and r ep l a ce d by a larg er
one.

( 99K . 188 )

13. The state may pla c e a prohib itory tax on the
use of trading stamp s. (101K . 789)
14. The leg i s l ature may differ entiate i n the
tre a t me nt required for different types of criminals.
( 104K. 481)

15. a railroad company cannot be compelled to
construct a private crossing at its own expense .
(lO?K.341)
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16. Under police power a pawndealer may be
required to keep records and fingerprints .
(llOK. 127)
17. The state may abrogate contra cts between
utility companies. (113K. 217)
18. A p erson c annot collect damages for indirect
impairment of property as a consequence of public
construction. (118K. 138)
19. The right to - practice law is a privilege
which the state may give or take away. (129 K. 853)
20.

Public utility companies may not be prohibited

from selling applianc es .

(137K. 717)

21. An owner may keep as many cats as he likes so
_long as he keeps them at home. (140K. 407)
22. One county of the state may not i mpose penalties
for crime which oth er countie s do not impose .(140K.
744)

23. A city may forbid the us e of its streets to
oil trucks exclusively. (145K. 825)
24. A city may change the name of a street against
the protests of certain property o'WD.ers. (146K. 974)
25. License for the sale of beer is privileg e to
be granted by the state and not an individual right.
(147K. 211)
26 . The state may void property titles unless
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certain conditions of transfer are met. (149K. 64)
27. A negro ha s a legal right to privileges of a
swimming pool at public expense. (147K. 471)
28. Food products, even though they contain wholesome ingredients, may be prohibited i n interests
of the public. (152K. 4)
29. Ra ilroads may be compelled to maintain cattle
guards at farm crossings. (115K. 545)
30 . Corporate ovmed cemeteries may not be taxed
while all other c eme teries are tax free . (139K.
417)

31. A bakert"' from within a city but selling products through the city merchants cannot be taxed
. heavier than bakers of the city. (133K. 67)
32. An expert witness can be comp elled to testify
at the ordinary rate of compensation. (145K. 928)
33. In time of no epidemic, a child cannot be
expelled from school because of ref usal to be
vaccinated. (64K. 507)
34. A sheriff may be removed from office for
mistreating prisoners. (139K. 744)
35. State may authorize township boards to license
billard halls at their discretion. (87K. 235)
36. Under the habitual criminal law, it is up
to the judge to discover past convictions of the
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defendant . (136K. 879)
37. Certain public officers may be deprived
of regular witness fees . (81K. 57)
38 . Separate schools may be maintained for
-fhite and colored children without violating
equal rights . (66K. 672)
39 . Ra ilroads cannot be required to give reduced
rates to national guardsmen except in times of
emergency . (84K . 264)
40. Islands f er med in n avigable streams are
public property and cannot be giv en to individuals .
(92K. 414)
41. Women may be given a different sentence than
. men for the same criminal offense. ( 106K. 139 )
42. A city can regulate t he use of private p rop erty through zoning ordinances . (113K. 153)
4 3 . Army and navy men may be g iven preference in
appointment to public office . · ( 68K. 765)
44. Dentists may be licensed and regulated. (44K
565)
45. A city· may require a special license for
professional peddlers. ( 34K. 16)
46. Farm prodqce comission merchants m~y be required to have a special license. (98K . 465)
47. To control orchard disease, one's trees may be
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destroyed and the expen9e of such act charged to
the property. (85K. 735) .
48. City authorities may bind their successors
with long time franchises to utility companies.
(48K. 99)
49. The initiative and referendum laws grant no

privileges or immunities. (93K. 405)
50. A city may grm t an exclusive right to the
high bidder to remove city garbage . ( 96K . 339)
51. A city manager form of government is not a
delegation of legislative powers. (100K. 399)
52. The power of pardon is not inferent in the
executive and may be regulated by the people
through the legislature. (116K. 116)
53. A contract between an elevator company and

a railroad company cannot be abrogated unless
it adversely affects the g eneral wel fare.
(139K. 677)

54. Non-lawyers may be denied the right t o give
legal counsel.

(142K. 4021

55. Voting is a privilege rather than a right
and may be

regula ted by the legislature even to

classifying voters. (144K. 813)
56. State may prohibit ail wells near railroad
lines. (104K. 1)
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57. Taxing all trades in which delivery trucks
are used is not unlawful discrimination. (112K.28 )
58. Citizen is not deprived of property without
compensation by being required to labor on the
streets.

(36K. 76)

59. Since the people act through the le gislature,
~hat body may do whatever is not prohibited by
the constituti on. (144K. 813)
60. The leg islature cannot delegate legislative
powers to the judiciary . (7K. 82)
61 . Neither absolute justice non the constitution
render a woman ineligible for the office of count y
superintendent.

(16K. 601)

62. Acts of the legisla t ure are limited only by
the state and federal constitution~. (74K . 1)
63. The legislature acting for the people is not
restricted by the constitution from regulation
of beer. (147K. 211)
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CHAPTER VI
TR.Ai.~SPORTATION AND CORRUPTION OF BLOOD;TREASON ;
SOLDIERS ; SEARCH A.T'iID SEIZURES ; IMPRI SOJ\ll'J1ENT FOR
DEBT; PROPERTY RIGHTS
This chapter includes sections 12, 13 , 14, 15,
16, and 17 of the Bill of Rights.

Section 12 , pro-

hibiting corruption of blood and forfeiture of estate,
has twice been clearly involved in c ases before the
Supreme Court.

Sections 13 and 14, dealing with treason

and with the quartering of soldiers, are of su ch nature
as n ot likely t o be i nvolved i n litigation in a state
that h as for the most part rema ined at peace.

Nei ther

of the s e two sec t ions has ever be en before the Court .
Section 1 5, dealing with search and se i zure, plays a
part in every arrest and ha.son

a number

been brought before the Supreme Court.

of occ asions
Section 16, per-

mitting imprisonment f'or debt only in case of fraud,
has been directly i nvolved in nine c as es, none of them
in recent years.

Section 17, orig ina lly providing that

in property rights there should b e no distinc tion betwe en
aliens and citizens, was amended by the p eople at the
election of 1888 to permit distinction between citizens
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and aliens, but t o forbid it between citizens of
Kansas and ci t izens of other s t at es.

This section has

been involved in a number of ca.ses before the Court.
Secti on 12. of the Bill of Rights:
"No person shall be transported from the
state for any offense committed within the s ame,
an d no conviction within th e sta t e shall work a
corruption of blood or a forf eit ure of es t at e ."
In state y. Snyder 34K. 425 (1885), the Court held
that the section of the prohibitory liquor l aw whi ch
provides that the judgment f or fine an d costs for
violation of th at l aw shall be a li en upon t he premi s es
where the intoxicating liquors were s old (even whe re
such premises are the propert y of other s and are merely
leased to the viola tor), does no t viola te the Bill of
Ri ghts by i nf licting for f eiture of estate .

The liab ility

created by the st a tu:be is n ot in th e nature of a f orfeiture, and the fine and cost s are not imposed upon
the owner of t he premises, but ar e i mposed upon the
person who v i olated the l aw ; and the owner of the premises
is simply made a surety for t heir payment .
In Hamb lin v. Merchant 103K. 508 (1918 ), the Court
held that a statute provi d ing that the property of a
deceased owner shall not go to the person who t ook t h e
owner's l i fe does not violate the Bill of Rights by
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infl i cting forfeiture of esta te.

The legislature

h as entire control of the mat ter of devolution of
prop erty on the death of the owner.

When the fact is

ascertained in a criminal prosecution that the descendant has murdered the property ovvner , the property
is not then tak en f rom the person who would inherit,
but it is then determined th at t he person has not inherited and has not acquired any interest in the property.

No property is taken from the convicted person

and there is no forfeiture. (previous to the enactment
of the statute questi oned in thi s case , i t was he ld
in McAllaster!.• Fair 72K. 533 (1906) that a. husband
who murdered his wife for the purpose of a c quiri ng h~
property could not be restrained from such i nher itance}
Section 13 of the Bill of Rights:
"Treason shall consist only of l evying war
against the state, adhering to its enemies, or
giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be
convict ed of treason unless on the evidence of
two witnesses to the overt a.ct, or confession
open court."
This section o:e the Bi ll of Ri ghts has never been
involved in any case before the Supreme Court of the
state.
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Section 14. of the Bill of Rights:
"No soldier shall, in time of peace , be
quartered in any hous e without the consent of
the occupant, nor in time of war, exc ept as
prescribed by law."
This section of the Bill of Rights ha s never
been involved in any case before the Supreme Court
of the state.
Section 15. of the Bi ll of Rights:
"The ri ght of t he people to be secure i n
their persons and property against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inviola te; an d
no warrant shall issue but on probable cause ,
supported by oath or affirmation , particularl y
descri bing the pl ac es t o be se arched and the
per sons or property to be s eized."
In State~- Glea son 32K. 245 (1884), the Court
held that a comp l aint filed i n the district court
charging a defnedant with a mis deme ano r and verified
on nothing but hear say and b elief, is not sufficent
to authorize t he issuance of a warr ant for t he arr est
of the party therein charged, when no previous pr reliminary examination, hav e been ha d.

"Oath or

.Affirmation" as c a lled f or in the Bill of Rights mus t
be positive with a sound bas e.
In Sta t e ~· Bl a ckman 32K. 615 (1884) , t he Court
held that where a defendant in a prosecut ion, without
objection, pleads to the merits of an a ct ion and goes
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to trial, he waives all irregul arities in t he verification of the inf ormat ion, and cannot afterwar d b e
h-eard to quest ion the regula rity or validity of any
proceeding in the c ase , if he urges no other ob jection
to~ the proceeding than that such verification is insuffici ent.

Here a verification f or ar r est on the

mer e belief of the county attorney was insuffi ci ent,
but t he defe ndant submitted to such fau lty arrest and
could not now challenge it.
In Sta te.!• Broo ks 33K. 708 (1885), the Court
held that whe re an information for arrest and prosecution i s sworn to po sit i v el y by same pers on, it is not
necessary for the county attorney to also verify the information by his own oath .
In In re Kell am 55K. 700 (1895), the Court held
as unconstitutional a statute conferri ng au thority upon
the police officers of a city to make arrests for misdemeanors without warrant upon "reasonable susp cbcion" .
If a warrant for arrest cannot be issued based on hearsay (St ate v. Gleason, 32K. 245), certa inly an arrest
based on mere suspicion would not ho ld.
In In~ Davis 68K .7 91 (1904), the Court he ld that
section 15 of the Bill of Rights was not violated in
compelling a banker to reveal a depositor's account.
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To obtain information from a witness of t he amount
and- location of anoth er's money or property cannot
come within the constit tutional inhibition aga i nst
unreaso nable searches and seizures as no property is
herein seized.
In State~· King 71K. 287 (1905 ), the Court held
t hat where a compih.aint is properly filed and verified,
a "John Doe" warrant may issue.

To mak e it necessa ry

to na111e criminals would give them a wide chance to go
free.

In this case where the :per son ma.king the veri-

fication could n &u e only t ,o of f our criminals, he
neverthel ess, had f our definite persons in mind.
In re Patterson 94K. 439 ( 1 91 5 ), Patterson was
paroled by the district court and l ate r his parole vms
revoked and he was s ent back to prison .

Patterson

charged that there was not prioper informat ion to verify
his violation of parole since there was no person to
swear or affirm such.

The Court held that failure of

the convict to observe conditions of his parole i s not
a new offense and that revocation of' parole and return
of the convict to prison is not an added punis hment,
but r ather a disciplinary regul ation of :prison management in carrying out the s ent ence already i mposed.

The

district court as parole court can set its ov.m- conditions
of parole.
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In State.!• Smithmeyer llOK. 172 (1921), the
Court held that a prosecuting attorney through subpoena
tecum ( thou shalt bring with thee) may comp el the
production of certain papers and records, but he cannot
t ake the cus tody of those papers from the person producing t hem.

The attorney is not authorized to retain

possession of documents after the examination of the
wi tnes s h as been completed.

Securing do cuments du c es

tecu..m is not search and seizure.
In State .Y.• Railwav Co. 115K. 3 (1924) , the Court
held th at the inspe ction of books, accounts, etc. of a
railway company by the Public Utilities Commis sion does
not viol at e the Bill of Rights.

To hold that the state

cannot inspect and examine the books , a ccounts , and
records of domestic co rpo r a tions, would be to say that
the state which creates corporations has not the reserved
power to control them.
Section 16. of the Bill of Right s :
"No person shall be i mprisoned f or debt,
except in cases of fraud."
I n ~ ~ Ebenhac k 17K. 618 (1877), the Court held
that the legislature has power to provide t hat, when upon
the trial of a mis demeanor the j ury shall find t he defendant not guilty, and shall also find that the prosecution
was instituted from malice or wi t hout prob able ca.use, the
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justice may adjudge the costs aga inst the prosecuting witness, and, if he fail to pay or give security
for their payment, may commit him to. the county jail
until they are paid.

Such imprisonment i s not in

conflict with section 16 of the Bill of Rights.

These

costs are cast upon the a ccuser as a penalty, and they
do not constitute strictly and simp l y a debt, in the
technical sense of the word, any more than the fine imposed upon a. party convicted of assault and battery, is
a debt.

In Tennent, Wal ker and QQ_. y. Weymouth ( 25K. 21
1881), the Court held that proof of fraud must be clearl y

shown to sust a in i mprisonment for debt.

In this ca se it

was stated t h at the defendants h d made deeds of their
farms to their wives but it was not shown that the wives
were not bona fide creditors, or th at there was any rea l
fraud in the a.ct. Fraud was presumed but not a ctually
proved.

In order to justify the issue of an order of

arrest, facts proving , and not merely f a cts consistent
with fr aud should be st a ted in the affidavit.
In Hauss~- Kohler 25K. 640 (1881), the Court held
that the creditor in ch ar ging fr aud is expected to make
out a plain case and state definite ground for his a ction.
Where an affidavit does not state any one of th e grounds
required by the statute under which the charge is being

?l
brought, all proceedings afterward had under it, or
by virtue thereof, are void.

--

I n In re Wheeler 34K. 96 (1885 ), the Court held
'

t hat provisions of se ction 16 of the Bill of Rights
applies only to liabilitie s arising upon contract.

A

father may be i mprisoned for fa ilure to pay a j udgment
rendered i n bastardy for the support of an illegitimate
child since such judgment is not a debt v, ithin t he
meaning of the Bill of Rights.
In 1.!!

Boyd 34K. 5?0 (1886), the Court held that

i mpriso11..i11ent for failure to p y costs of t ri a l is not
i mprison.11ent f or debt.

Judgment for costs is not a p art

of the punishrlent, and even where a pri s oner has been
pardoned by the Governor he i s no

rele as ed f r om his

liability to p ay the co sts , or to be i mpri s oned in case
they a r e not paid .

The ri ghts of the court officials

to compensation for condutting trial are vested ri ghts
which cannot be disturbed or lessened by any par don from
the governor.
In In re Dassler 35K. 678 (1886), the Court rest ated
that provisions of section 16 of the Bill of Rights apply
only to liabilities arising upon co ntract , and that imprisonment for failure to p ay road tax do es not violate
the section.
In State~· Weiss 84K. 165 (1911), t he Court held

?2

that section 16 of the Bill of Ri ghts p ermits the
legislatur e to i mprison for fr audulent debt but does
not compel the legis l ature to i mprison in such cases .
Imprisonment i n cases of f ra.ua. i s opt i onal, but there
can be no impri s on~1ent f or debt other than fraudulent .
In Burnett~- Trirnmell 103K. 130 (1918 ), the
"Bulk Salesn l asw was questioned.

This l aw provi ded

that s ale of goods shall be void as agians t the creditors of the seller unless ~he purchas er receives from
the sellei~ a lis t of n ames and addr ess e s of the
creditors and the pur cha ser at le as t seven days before
t aking possession or paying t herefor notify every creditor whose name is listed •

.Any

s eller knowingly

omitting the name of any creditor is subject to fi ne
and imprisomnent.

The Court he l d that the r e was no

violation of the Bill of Ri ght s s ince i mpriso nment as
provided in the statute was not f or failure to pay
debt s , but for failure to do the thing expressly enjoine d by the statute in ref erence to preparin g a l ist of
credito rs.

Such re gul a tion was valid us e of the p olice

power.
In Board of Education~- Scoville 13K. l? (18?4),
the Court he ld that a garnishee . ay not be indef inttely
i mprisoned for fai lure to pay a debt t o a judgment- debtor.
If such were the ca se, th e garnishee could be imprisoned
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forever, since there is no provision for hi s dischar ge
before he pays the debt.

The Court c ould give a def inite

i mprisonment term as a punis hment for cont empt.
Section 17. of the Bill of Rights:
"No distinction shall ever be ma.de b etween
citizens of the stat e of Kans·as and citi zens of
other states an d t errit ori es of t he United State s
with r ef erenc e tq the purcha se, enjoyment or descent of prop erty . Th e rights of a liens i n
ref erence to t he purchas e , enjoyment of descent
of property runy be regul ated by l aw ."
(Thi s s ection was submitted to and a dopt ed
by t h e people at t h e election of 1888 . The
origina l section 17 read, "No di s tinct i on shall
ever be made between citi z en s and ali ens i n reference to the purc has e, enj oyment of de s c ent of
pr operty".)
In Manley!• Mayer 68K. 377(1904 ), t h e Court held
as constitutional a st a tut e pr oviding f or enforc ement
of the contract obligat ion of a non- r esident by at t a chment and sale of his Kens a s r~a l e s tate in an act i on
brought against t he non-re s ident executor.

The con-

tention th at it was an unlawful di s crimi nat ion t o allow
an att a crun.ent to issue aga ins t a non- r es i dent and not
against a r esident executor was met by t he f a ct that
the proceeding was a mere device for obtaining j urisdiction of the prop erty for the purpos e of appl y ing it
to t he payment of debts, there being no oth er way by
which personal jurisdiction of the non-resi dent c ould
be obt a i ned s ince the court can not compel out-o f - st at e
residents to appear.
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In Sparks
tiff

I~

Bodensi ck 72K. 7 (1905), the plain-

s ought to ·withhol d t itle to one-h e l f of an est ate

from alien descendants on the ground t hat tl.t the time
of the l andholder's death (18 73} t h e rule of t he common
law, that a.li ens cannot inhertt real estat e, was in
force in Kan sas.

The Court he ld that the ori ginal sec-

tio n 17 of the Bill of Ri ghts was such as to cause
statutes determining th e course of desc ent of property
to apply equally t o a.liens and citizens. ·
In State

I·

Ellis 72K. 287 (1905) , the Court held

that the common l aw di d not apply and that resi dent
cit izen h al f - s isters of the resident cit izen who died
in est ate, le aving neither widow nor children , and whose
parents both had died bef ore h i m t'vh ile non . r e s ident aliens,
can inherit i mmedi ately and directly the l ands of the
deceased and such l ands shall not e s cheat t o the stc1te .
Under th e common l aw hal f bloods could not inher it.
In Cramer -:z.... Mcc ann 83K. 719 (1911), t he Court held
that under the amended s ec t ion 17 of the Bill of Ri ghts,
the legislature has full p ower t o enact laws regul atin g
the r i ght of aliens to ho l d r ea l estate.

An act, pro-

viding th at resident citizens of t he United St ates can
not inherit lands in this stat e t hroug the operat ion of
the statute of des c ent s and distributions when t hey must
trace their desc ent through a cousin of the parent, who
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was an alien at the time of his death, is constitutional.
In Johnson y. Olson 92K. 819 (1914), the Court
held that in the absence of a governing treaty, and under section 17 of the Bill of Rights as adopted in
1888, where there is not statute regulating the inheri tance of property by aliens , the common law rule
that an alien cannot inherit from a deceased citizen
prevails.
In Botello y. Tharp 121K. 229 (1926), the Court
restated the rule that in the absence of a federal
treaty or a nontrolling statute, an alien can neither
tak e land by des cent nor transmit it to another,

Un-

der common l aw citizen childr e n can not i nherit from
an alien father.
In .Rieman y. Rieman 123K. 718 (1927), the appellant was adopted by a brother of the deceased intestate
pursuant to an Illinois statute wh ich declar ed that

11

to

all other persons (than the adoptive parents) the adopted c hild shall stand related as if no such act of
adoption had been taken 11

•

The Court held that such

limited status of adoption bars her rights to s hare in
t he estate of the brother of h e r adoptive father, and
that such ruling does not violate the constitution.
'l'he appellant was not denie d the right of inheri ta nee
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because she was a citizen of Illinois, but because of
the limited s tatus of adoption conferred upon her.
In Riemann y . R i ~ 124K . 539 (1927), t h e Court
reversed its form e r ruling and held that the devolution
of intestate personal property is governed by t he law
of the domicile of the descendant, and the devolution
of intestate real property is governed by the law of
the state where it is situat ed.

A c hild adopted in a

foreign state has inheritable capacity to lands si tuated in t his state in confo rmit y wit h our l aws governing t he distri bu tion of intestate estat es, notwithstanding the laws of t :ie foreign state where t he adoption
proceedings were effected imposed upon the child a
disqualificatio n to i nherit from t he col lateral kindred of her adoptive pa.rent.
In Fergus

Y· Tomlinson 126K. 427 (1928), the Court

held that the co mmon l aw i s in f o r ce in this state unless abrogated by statute.

Under t he common l aw ali-

enage is not an obstacle to t h e acquisition of title
to personal property by one next of kin.

The hus band ,

in this case a British subject, may i nherit his wife's
personal property.

In summary of the foregoin g cases it may b e stated
that the Supreme Court of the State of Kam as has held
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its citizens to the following principles:
1. Property used as selling place for liquor is
lien for fine and costs reg ardless of ownership.
( 34K. 425)
2. The legislatu r e has entire control of the devolution of prope r ty on death of the owner. (103K. 508)
3 . A warrant for arrest cannot be issued only on
heaBs ay an d belief . ( 32K. 245)
4 . If an objection to faulty arrest is to stand,
it must be made before the defendant goes to
trial. ( 32K. 615)
5 . Oath of county atto rn ey i s not essential to veri-

fy an information f or arrest. (33K. 708)
6 . Arrests cannot be made upon sus picion alone.
( 55K. 700)

7. S earch an d seizure is not violated in compelling
a banker to reveal a depositor ' s account. (68K. 791).
8 . It is not necessary to name the criminals i n
issuing warrant for t heir arrest. ( 71K. 287)
9. Ap prisoner may be seized for viol ation of
parole at the discretion of the parole court.
( 94K. 439)

10. Prosecuting attorney can 1 t retain possession
of documents which he has forced into court t hrou gh
duces tecum.

(llK. 172)
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11. A railroad company's records may be examined

by the state. (115K. 3 )
12. An accusor wh o bring s prosecut ion from malice

and without pro bable cause may be i mprisoned for
failure to pay costs i n t h e case which he has instigated. (17K. 61 8 )
13. Proof of fraud mu s t be cl early shown to sus -

tain imprisonm ent for debt. ( 25K. 21)
14. A creditor charg ing fraud must make out a
plain case and state definite ground s f o r h is action ( 25K- 640)
15.

11

Debtu as used in section 1 6 of the Bill of

Ri ghts applies only to liabiliti es arising upon
co n tract. (34K. 96)
16. Imprisonmen t for f ailure to pay costs of trial

is not imprisonment for

II

debt 11

•

(

34K. 570)

17. I mprisonme nt f or f ailure to pay road tax is

not i mprisonmen t for "debt". (35K. 678)
18. Imprisonment f or fraudulent debt is optional
and not co mpulsory. (84K. 165 )
19. 'ritle to property may be voided if conditions of transfer are n ot met. (103K. 130)
20. A garnishee may not b e indefinitely imprlilsoned

until he s hall pay a de )t to a judgment-debtor.
( 13K. 17)
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21. Discrimina tion is legal which p ermits a tt a c llment
to issue a g ai ns t a non-resident and not a gainst a
resi d ent executor. ( 68K. 377)
22. Under t h e o r i ginal section 17 of the Bil l of
Rights, statutes ap plied equally to aliens and citi z ens • ( 7 2K • 7 )

23. Common law rule t hat half-bloods cannot i nherit
does no t apply in Kans as. (72K. 287)
24 . The leg i s lature has full pow er to ena ct laws
regulating the right of al iens to hold re al estate. (8 3K . 719)
25. In absence of s Latutory regul ation , t he common law rule t ha t an all e n cannot inhe rit from a deceas ed citizen p revails. ( 9 2K. 819)
26. Devolution of intestate real prop er ty is g overned by t h e law of t he state where it is situat ed.
( 124K. 539)

This reversed ( 123K. 712)

27. Common law is in force i n this state unless
abrog ated by Statute.

(12 6K . 427)
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CHAPTER

VII

SLAVERY; BAIL; J"USTICE WITHOUT DELAY

This chapter includes sections 6, 9, and 18 of
the Bill of Rights.

~ection 6, prohibiting slavery

or involuntary servitude except for punishment of·
cri me, has been before the oupreme Court in only
four cl_ear-cu t cases, none of wh ich have been in recent ye ars .

Section 9, concern ing bail and punish-

ments, has been nj_ne times directly involved in ;;jupreme
Court cases.

Section 18, guaranteeing remedy by due

course of law , has furnished grounds for much litigatio n .

'1'he increasing i mp ort a nc e of t h i s section is

evidenced by the fact that ne arly half the cases have
come ·before the Court since 1930 .

Section 6

of the Bill of Rights:

There shall be no slavery in this state;
and no involuntary servitude, except fo r the
punishment of cri me, whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted.
In In re Dassler 35K. 678 ( 1886) , the uourt held
that an act requiring work on the roads to pay p oll
tax is valid.

Perf orlW.nce of work up on an assessment

or levy payable in labor for the repair of ro a ds or

8.1

streets, is not that kind of involuntary servitude
intended to be embraced within section 6 of the bill
of J:{i ght s.

Mi lita r y service is also compulsory, but

it is not held in conflict with t he Bill of Ri ghts.
There are cert ain services which may be co mnan ded fo r
t h e good of s ociety through the police p ower .
In City of' To:peka v. Boutwell ·. 53K . 20 ( 1894) ,
an ordinan ce permitt i ng emp loyment of
on the st re ets was held valid.

city pris oners

The defe ndants were

jailed for fa ilure to pay their fi nes and we re put to
work a t $1 per day credit on their fines .

The Cou rt

argued that the labor was not menti oned in the sentence
a nd could ha r dly be c onsidered as a valid part of t h e
pun i shment .
of

:::;treet labor was held as a proper means

col le cting the fin e s and as discipline for the

p riso ners .
In In re Wheeler

_34K . 96 (1885), previously

cited, the Court held that i mprisonment for failu re
to pay a j udgment under the bastardy act for the nB.inten a nce and educa t ion of an illegitimate child was
pr ope r and constitutional.
In I n re Boyd

34K. 570 (18 8 6), p revious l y cited ,

the Court held tha t i mprisonment for non- p a yment of
the costs is no pa rt of t he punish ment and is a pr oper
means of enforcing payment.
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Section 9

of the Bill of Rights:

All persons shall be bailable by suf'f'icient
sureties excep t for capital offense s , where
p roof is evident or the p resump tion great .
Ex ces s i ve ba i 1 shall not be requ ired, nor excessive fines i mp osed, n o r cruel or unusual
pun is hment inflicted .
In State v . White

4 4K . 514 (1890), a nineteen

yea.r old boy was c onv icte d for rape of a sixteen ye a r
old girl of questionable cha r a cter and was sentenced
5 to 21 years at hard l~bor.

In revievving the sentence,

the Court held that a lthou gh the punish ment may be
considered severe , yet it is not unconstitutional.
Impris onment at h ard labor is not of itself a cruel

or unusual punishment within the mean ing of the B ill of
Rights .
I n In re E llis

76K. 368 ( 1907), the c ourt h eld

that the r efu sal of the county co mmissioners to dis- .
cha r g e a convicted p erson who has been found to b e unab le to pay the fine or costs wil l not make his i mprisonment cruel or unusual .
-In In re Schneck 78K. 20? (1908), the Uourt h eld
that p enalty is incurred when the a ct of cri me is
co mmi tt..ed.

A p e rson charged with the cri me o:t' murder

in the first degree, at a tirm when the statute prescribed the penalty of death for the of fense, is not,
whe re the proof is evident or the presumption g reat,
"\
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entitled to bail, a lthough the prosecution for the
offense may have been co mraenced after the rep eal of
that penalty and the enactment of an amendment imp osing the penalty of imprisonment for life.

Murder

in the first degree was a capital of fense at the time
it was here co mrn.i tte d , and therefore t he def'endant
was no t

entitled t o bail.

In State v . Gillmore

88K.:

8 36 l}913), the (;ourt

held tha t nard labor in the penitentiary not exceeding
two years was not unusual or cruel punishment for
failure to o bey orders of' su pp ort in a · c a se of deserti on and non-sup p ort of wi:f e or family .
In Tatlow v. Hacon
held tha t

101K. 27 (1 917) , the Gourt

statutory prov i s ion that· n execution msLy

issue .aga inst the person of a debtor for c er t ain fraud ulent a cts i s not violative of l imitati on against
cru el and u nusual punish ments.

·A

prison sentence is

proper for fraud in inducing the plaintiff to e x ch an ge land for a worthl ess dee d .
In State v. c;oletti

102K. ·523 ( 1918), the Court

held a s not violative of '' e x cess ive bail" a statute
providing that in appeals from convictions in misdemeanors, the defendant is to give a bond conditioned
upon the payment of the fine and costs within thirty
days after affirn:ation of the judgment by the appellate
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court, and also to give a bond co n di tioned that he
will not violate, p ending t h e ap peal, the law under
which the conviction was o b tained.
I n In re B~ll

106K . 5 36 { 192 0), the Court held

that a sta tute of 1911, providing n o b a il for persons
cha r g ed with murder i n the first degree where pro of- i s
evident or presu:m_pti on gr eat, viola tes t h e bill of
Rights.

Tufurder in the f irst degree was not in 1920

pun i shable c api t ~lly, and p ersons charged wit h that
offense co uld not be denied bail .
In Dav i son v. Da vison

1 25K . 80 7 .(1928 ), the Court

held tha t j a ili ng a pa rtn e r in a divorce suit for co n temp t of court b ecaus e she c anno t

deliver to the hus-

band an a uto mobil e, which has fallen · nto t he han ds
of the sheriff, or money which nas _a lre a dy b een sp ent,
amounts to li f e imprisonment a nd is voide d by sectj_on 9
of t h e 13i 11 of Rights as '·' cruel a nd unusual u

.

It is

proper for the co urt to jail for c ontempt wh er e it is
imp lied tha t

the cou rt' s or d ers ca n be ob eyed ,

but

here it was i n~ossi b l e to obey the m.
In In re Ma cLean

147K. 146 ( 1 9 3 8 ), the <:.fourt

held that judgment i mp osing consecutive pe riod s of
penal servitude in accordance wi t h the verdict of
guilty on specific counts charged in _the info r ma tio n
did not violate section 9 of the B ill of Righ ts f orbidding cruel and unusual p unishments.
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oection 18

of the Bill of rtight s:

All persons, for injuries suf f ered in
person, reput a tio n or property, shall nave
remedy by due course of law , and justice
administrated withou t de lay.
In K. P. Railway Co . v . Yan z

16K. 5'73 (18 76 ) ,

the Court h eld that section 18 of the Bill of' Rights
is not violated by a st a tute g iving t h e owner of
live s tock the ri ght to recov er attorney-fees and denying
that ri ght to the railway c ompa.ny, wh ere the railway
co mpany has kil led livestock f or t h e p l aintiff .

~h is

is c onsid ered p ro p er use of p olice pow e r to pro tect
the genera l we ll-being.

Attorney's fees in these cases

might b e mo r e t han t h e p rice of the lo st livestock .
In In re Davis

58K . 368 ( 1897) , a legislative

co I11J11ittee sitting after t he l egis l a ture had adjourn ed
sine die sou ght to hold .Davis for co mtempt on h is
refusal to produ ce c ertain recor ds .

'l' h e Court held

that t h e co mmittee had no power to imprison the witness.

The House i t self could have i mprisoned f or con-

tempt, but suc h p ower coul d not be perpetuated in a
co mmittee.
In Atchison, 'l'opeka and Santa F e R~ R. v.
Matthews

58K. 447 (1897), previously cited, the Court

held tha t collection of attorney's fees from a railroad
along with damages for fire caused by a loco mo tive was
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in the nature of a police regulation, designed to
enforce care on the part of the railway company and
was not intended to place a burden on such companies
that private persons are not required to bear.
In Buckwalter v. ochool District

65K. 603 (1902),

the plaintiff cha rged that she should have been notified, before hand tha t

she was in t h e proc es s of ob-

taining fro m the state could be taken for a school
house site.

The Court h eld that under eminent domain

the plaintiff has a right to his day in cou rt on the
question of comp ensation, but he has no ri gh t to a
day in court on the question of a p pro p ri a tion by the
state unless some statute r e quires it.

The state s

right to t a Ke land exists independen ly of notice.
In Hanson v. Krehbiel 68K. 670 (1904), the Court
ruled that a statute, providing that in cases of libel
where the writer public1y retra cts his statements, t he
injured is entitled only to what actual financial loss
he can show resulted, is void as not allowin g due
course of law to show injury through disgrace, ridicule, and humiliation, which could only be determined
by a trial considering the circumstances.

Remedy by

due course of 1aw as used in the Bill of Rights, means
the reparation for injury, ordered by a tribunal having jurisdiction, in due course of' procedure and after
a fair hearing.
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In Cooper v. oearverns

81K. 267 (1909), pre -

viously cited, the Court he ld that the common law
rule, that spoken words imputing unchastity to a
female are not actionable without allegation and p roof
of special damages, deprives women of due process as
her reput ation is one of her most v aluable assets.
In Shade v. Cement Co. 93K. 257 (1914), the Court
held th a t an employee has no co nsti tuti onal grounds
to object to provisions of the workmen 1 s comp ensation
1aw since its operation r e sts up on the free consent
of employer and emp loyee.

Without consent to come

under the co mpensation law, th e empl oyee may retain
his remedies under common and statutory law.
In Oil and Gas Co. v. ~trauss llOK. 61 1 (1923),
the defendant argued that the district court was p rejudiced aga inst the .defendant 1 s case and re ached a
conclusion without due process.

It was pointed out

that after motion for a new trial and the motion f or
additional findings of fact were filed, b ut before
they were heard, the judge took co p ies of the motions,
c onside r ed them together with the pleadings and evidence,
and wrote down a concl us ion concerning what should. be
done on the motions.

Afterward the motions were heard

and the court rendered judgment in accordance with
the previous written conclusion.

'l'he Court h eld that

here was no violation of due process, tha t both parties
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were heard, and that the judge could have changed his
farmer con cl us ion if the or a l arguments warranted such
change.
In Railroad and Light Co. v . Court of Industrial
Rel at ions

113K. 217 ( 1923), previously cited, the

Court held that there was no violation of due process
and that the police power was pro p erly used where the
Public Utilities Commission nullified contracts concerning rates for electricity to be supplied by an
electric power company to a street railway, when performance of those contracts at the agreed schedules
of rates so materially diminished the revenues of
the power company as to cause other customers of the
p ower company to have to bear a p ortion of the burden
resulting from such contracts.
In Glenn v. Gallahan

125.K. 44 ( 1928), the <.;ourt

held as not violative of section 18 of the .bill of
Rights, a

statute d e claring that all transfers of

p roi)erty by a stockholder, after the closing of a
bank and before the payment of the double liability,
as provided in the statute, shall be void as against
said double liability.

·the Court argue d that banking

was a ·business in which th e public has a vital interest
and for that reason it is subject to control by the
state under its police pow er.
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In Wichit a Council v. Security ~enefit Ass•n
138K. 841 (1934), the uourt held that a benef it
society orga nized and operating under the laws of
this state is not authorized to enact a by-law giving
it s national executive committee authority to suspend
a

subordinate coun cil and dissolve its charter without

charges having been filed, notice given thereon, and
a hearing t hereof .

It was argued tha t such proceeding

was a t aking away of property ri ghts even though provision had been made for transfer of the members to
other councils and insurance was kept intact .

Such

transfer meant exp ense for the members.
ln Trimble v. Uity of' Topeka

14 7K. 111 ( 1938) ,

the plaintiff cha llenged a city ordi nance re gulating
barbering where such ordinance denied rughts granted
by t he state and grante d rights denied by the st a te .
The Court held tha t the city ordinance was void, a nd
that if' a barber met the state regulations it was
eno ugh .

Buch a n ordinance would p rop erly come under

the police p ower, but _in this case it added nothing
to the general welfare· not already provided for by
statute.

In Kansas City Life Insur~nce · co. v. Anthony
142K. 671 (1935), the Court held that where a judgment bas been rendered by a co mp etent court agai nst
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the defendant, ordering a sheriffts sale of real
property encumbered by mortgage and fixing the prop er
· period of redemption under the law then existing, such
judgment i s ~ adjudicata when no ap peal is taken
therefrom, and cannot be annulled or set a side by

In this c a se the

subsequent act of the legislature.

petition in foreclosure was filed in 1932 before the
mortgage mor a torium laws were passed, and the defenda nt
was not denied due process by being refuse.d the b enefit
of such 1aws.
In Schuler v. Rehberg

145K. 174 (1937), a dis-

trict court, against. the wishes of the judgment c r editor,
refuis ed to confirm a sale in forec l osur e where the sale
would pay only a part of the debt.

he Court h e l d

that where there is no i r regularity in the p roceecting s,
and no substanti a l dis.p arity between t h e actua l value
of the property and the selling price at the sale in
foreclosure, the judgment creditor has an absolute
right to have the sale confirmed, and to deny such
right violates even handed justice t .o all li t i g ants.
In Leigh v. City of Wichita

148K. 614 (1938),

. the uourt held that city zoning ordinances come under
.

-

the police p ower and do not violate the Hill of nights
by taking property without due process of law.
In Loomis v. City of Augusta

151K. 343 (1940),

the plaintiff contended that construction of a dike

76 /'"" ,'--'
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along the river would so change the flow of flood
waters as to inundate his land where before it wa s
safe from flood.

He sought com.p en sation for loss in

value of his land since he could not now sell it for
residential plots.

fhe Court held tha t since there

was no actual appropri ation of any property the owner
was not entitled to claim damages for merely incidenta.l,
indirect and consequential injuries which his property
might sustain by reason of a public work or construction.
However, such a decision will not stop t he plaintiff
from br inging a subse qu ent action if actual damage
does occur.
In Callen v. Junctio n City

43K. 627 (1890), t he

plaintiff' charged that i n corporation of his property
into t h e city was a violation of the .Bill of rtights
in t hat it took pr ivate property for p ub lic use with out just comp ensation.

Th e Court held that the me re

change of the use of land from agricultural to city
purposes is not taking of private property f or public
use.
In State v. McM3.nus

65K. 720 (1902), the state

condemned and publicly destroyed liquor, containers,
and bar.

The defendant charged discrimination against

them and their property and that property could not
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be thus destroyed.
had been

The Court held that the defendant

ven notice and opportunity to def end his

property and that as public nuisance the property
could legally be destroyed.
is tried

i~ ~ '

Property so kept and used

regardless of "whether there has been

an arrest or conviction of the person charged with mai ntaining the place.
In Chamberlain v. Mo. Pac. H.R. Co. 107K. 341
(1920), previously cited, the uourt held that co mpu lsion of a railroad company to arn st ruct a private crossing
on land through· which they had obt a ined a right-ot·-way,
deprived the r a ilroad of prop erty without just comp ensation and violated the ~ill of Hights.
In Edmonds v. ~ eder al ~ecuritie s uo. 131K. 11
{1930), the defenda nt char ged that a statute author-

izing the trial court to render judgment against a
litigant who refuses to answer qu estions or to produce
b ooks, pap ers and documents pe rtinent to the issues
of fact, is viol a tive of the Bill of Hi ght s in tha t i t
deprives the defendant of property without due process.
The Court held that it· is proper for the legislature
to facilit a te litiga tion, and tha t in this case the
defendant is not deprived of property without due process.
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He is· entitled to his day in court if he wi 11 abide
by the code of procedure which the l e gislature nas
adopted for the guidance of the courts.
In Hushaw v. Kansas .!farmers union .Royality~.
149K. 64 (1939), previously cited, the Court h eld

that a statute providing that instruments conveying
mineral ri ghts are v oid unless recorded within 90
days a fter execution and if not l isted for t axation,
was not void a s cal ling for f orf ei tur e of pr ope rty
with out due process .

Requirements set down in the

statute are to b e considered a c~ndition p recedent to
the vesting of title in the transf eree and not a 1·orfeit ur e of

a

vested title.

SUMMA.RY
In summary of the cases in this chap ter it may
be stated that the Supreme uourt of - the state of
Kansas has held its citizens to the following p rinc iples:
l.

Work on the roads to pay po ll tax is not in-

voluntary servitude.
2.

(35K. 678)

Fri s one rs in the city jai 1 may be required

to wo rk on the streets.
3.

( 53K. 20)

Imprisonment is legal for f a ilure to support

an illegitinate child.

( 34K. 96)
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5.

Sentence of 5 to 21 years at hard labor for

comnutting rape is not cruel or unusual punishment.

{44K. 51~)
Penalty is incurred when the act of crime

6.

is co mm.itted and comes un de r st a t ute s t h en in
force.
7.

( '78K. 20 7 )

Two yea rs at h a rd labor is not a cruel or

unusual punishment for non-supp ort of wife.
( 88K.

8.

836)

Prison sentence for a debtor convicted of

fraudulent acts is not cruel a nd unusual puni sh men t .

9.

( 10 lK. 2 7 )

.Hequirement of a d ouble b ond, o ne for fine

and costs, and one for l awful behavior does not
violate "excessive ba il".
10.

(102K. 523)

Bail c a n be r e fused only in capit a l of fense.

(106.K. 536)
11.

Person may not be i mprisoned for contempt

where it is impossible to obey the court 1 s
orders.
12.

( 125K. 807)

there is no limit to the length of a total

sentence which may be imposed by consecut ive
sentences on specific counts.
13.

(147:K. 146)

In certain suits for damages, railroads

rray be held to pay attorney's fees for the
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plaintiff.
14.

A

{ 16K. 573)

legislative committee sitting after the

legislature has adjourned ~ine _3ie can 1 t hold
a witness for contempt.
15.

( 58K. 368 )

under eminent domain, the st a te may ap prop -

riate one's land with out even giving notice of
such intentions.
16.

(65K . 603)

lvlere payment of wh a t act ual f inan ci al loss

c a n be sh own does not cancel a li b el ch arge.
670)

( 6 8K.

17.

Anything that detra cts from a wonan's

character is actiona·ble in co u rt.
18.

An emp loyee has no groun ds to ob ject to

conditions which h e volunt a ril y
self.
19.

( 8 1K . 267 )

l ect s for .him-

( 93K . 257)
A

judge may write down a dec i sion against

a litiga nt before hearing his comp leted case.

t 110K. 611)
20.

Through th~ state, contracts between

utility companies may be ob liga ted.
21.

( 1 13.K . 217)

.1:'rop erty o"bt a ined from a stockh older of a

closed ba nk is subject to liabilities of the
former owner.

22,.

(125K. 44)

.National officials of an organi za ti on can-

not dissolve a local branch without notice a nd
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hearing.
23.

A

(138K. 841)

barber need not meet city r e gul ation~

where they .conflict with state regulations.
( 148K. 111 )
24.

::i.tat e moratorium laws do not apply to ca ses

where p roceeding s were b egun before 1933.

l 1 42K. 671)
2 5.

.\

'lhe court may n ot refuse to co nfirm a.

fore clo sure sale where there are no i'regula rities
and the price is reasonable.
26.

(14 5K. 174)

One has no remedy against a city t hat suo-

tract s fro m the v alue of onets p ro p erty by zon ing
ordinances.
27.

( 148K. 614)

A public construction may ind ir ectly re -

duce the value of one's prop erty and t he re is
no i m..me diate remedy.
28.

(151:K.. 343)

une's property may be incorpora ted into a

city and brought under its jurisdiction and one
is entitled to no comp ensation.
29.

( 43K . 627 )

~iquor p r operty may be destroyed whe ther

or not there has been any arrest of the p roprietor.
( 65K. 72 0 )

30.

A

railroad co mpany may not be comp elled to

c onstruct a private crossing at its own -expense.
(107K. 3~1)
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31.

'l'he court may render judg ment a gai nst a

liti,g ant wh o refuses to p roduce pa p ers and
documents.
32.

(131K . 11 )

'rhe le gisl a t u re may set u p conditions of'

tra nsfer of p ro p erty wh ich must be me t o r the
p ro p erty must later be f orfeited.

(149K. 64 )
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CHAPTER VIII

'l' RL L BY JURY; : HABEAS CORPUS; ·1·RIAL PROCEDURE

'l;his. ch ap ter includes sections 5, 8 , and 10 of
the Bill of Rights.•

~ection 8, gua r antee ing the right

to the writ of habea s corpus, has been i ndirectly involved in many c as es, but on no occasion h as direct
viol a tion of this section be e n charged .

Sect ions 5

and 10, dealing w ith trial by jury .and tria l pr oce dure,
have been involved in c as es ·befo re t h e t>upreme Court
more often t han any other sections of t he B ill of
Rights.

In mor e than one hundred fifty c ases has

violation 6f one or oo~h of t h ese secti ons b een contended.

These c as e s are f'ai rly evenly distributed

throu gh the years, a nd in almost every term since its
beginning , the st at e ::i.upreme Court bas been c a lled

"

upon to de ter mine the meaning of t h e se sections.
Sectio n 5

of the Bill of Bights f

'I'he right of trial by jury shall be inviolat e.
In Kimball v . Connor 3K . · 410 ( 1 866) , the Court
held tha t section 5 of the Bill of Rights does not
requi re every trial to be by jury.

Trial by jury is
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guaranteed only in t h ose ca ses triable a t co mmon law.
In st a tutory and cha ncery p roceedings t h e le gi s l a ture
is co mp etent to di s p en se with t h e jury .

An a c t ion to

cont e s t a will i s a n e quita bl e p roce e di ng a n d may be
trie d without a jury .
In St a te v . All e n 5K. 213 ( 1 8 69) , the Gou r t h e l d
t ha t in a ll ori gina l proceeding s , the o upreme Gourt
h a s p ow er t o send i ssu e s of fa ct to a j u r y f or tr i a l,
whet h er, a s a matter o f

s tr i ct

entitled to a jury tri a l

ri ght, eit h e r pa rty i s

or n ot .

I n City o f .l!.mpor ia v . Volm er

12K . 62 2 (1 8 74) ,

the Court h e ld th at wher e a st a tute auth ori z e s a t ri a l
before a mut,1ici pal cou rt, wit h out a j u ry, f' or a v j.olation of a city or dinance, a nd a t t he s ame ti me
secures to the defend a nt a n appe a l t h ere f ro m, clog ge d
by no u n rea so na ·ble r es tric t ions, to an appella t e
court in wh ich he has a ri gh t to a tri a l by a j ur y ,
su c h summa ry proc e eding is not i n co nf lict wit h t h e
constitut ional provision that the

0

ri gh t of t r i a l b y

jury sha ll be inviol a te " .
I n Boa r d of Educ at ion v. ~covil l e

1 3K . l ?

(1 8 74), the Uourt held tb..a t in proc e e ding s for the

recovery of money a man ' s rights ~an b e d eterm ined
a gainst h is w i 11 only oy a jury, a nd in s uch c a ses
an order made by tbe court is not suf'ficient .
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In Ross v. C9 rmnissioners of Crawf ord Count;x;
16K. 411 (1 8 76) , the p l a inti ff sought a jury tri a l
in proceedings to co rr ect assessmen ts .

The Court

held that one is entitled to a jury only in those
c ases and p roceeding s as p rior to the constitution
gave the ri ght

to a j u r y .

As to a ll ot her m.a.t te rs

wh ich p rio r t o t h e . constit u tion were disp o se d. of oy
sumrra ry p roceedings , the legisl a t ur e ma y ITB,ke similar
pr ov is i on t o day •

s t o pr oc eedi ngs in assess nient ,

not enforcing in a ny way a penalt y , either by f ine or
by double or t r iple t ax, no ri ght

to j u ry e x i sted

prior to t he c on st it u ti on .
I n Hi xon v. Ge org e
h eld th a t the

18K . 253 (1 8 77) ,. t h e Court

u e sti on of 1:Yheth er credit r s o:r t h e

husba nd could look t o the f amily re s ide n c e in the
wife ' s name f or set tlement of t h etr clat ms i s an
a ction in t he natur e of a s u it in e qu ity, a nd th a t
the court may i n it s di s cret ion d.eci d e the case o r

s end a l l or any part of it t o a jury .

l f the co u rt

s end s al 1 t h e i ssu e s to a jury , it may do so by a
gene r al order, wit h out even mentioning any p articular
i s we, and the jury may t h en f ind a g eneral v e~dict
on a ll issues of both fa ct and law , unles s otherwise
order by t h e court .
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I n ..Q~rpent.e r v . ca rpenter
the Court h eld t hat a tri ai
re:ru sing to

30K . 712 (1 883),

court is not in error in

submit a divorc e ca se to a jury f or trial.

Such cas~s a re p ro p erly tried by the court, which
may or may not or der ··any is sue or i s sue s in su ch ca se
to be trie d

by

a jury.

ln In re Rolfs

30K . 758 (1 88 3), the petit i oner

was fined by a police judge for ke epi ng a nu i sance
a nd was refused an a pp e a l t o the d istric t

court.

Th e

Court held that in t h i s c ase se ct io n 5 of th e .tsill
of Rights w a. s violated.

lf the prosecution invo lved

n othi n g o f a cri minal nature, as one ch ar ged with
auctioneering wit h out a license, then t he con stitutiona l gua r an te e mi ght

not be ap plica bl e ; b ut w~ e re

the cha r ge is cri mj_nal a t co rnmon l <;'l.W , cri mi na 1 in its
nature, tri al by jury must be pre se r v e d .
I n In re Bu r r

ON

s

38K . 675 ( 1 88 8) , the Cour t h eld

tha t a judgment de btor is not entitled to tria l by
jury to determine whethe r he unju stly refuse s to appl y
money in h is possessi on toward satis f a ct i on of the
judgment u nde r which proceedings a re had .
In State v . City of 'l' opeka

3 6K . 76 (1 886) , the

Court h eld t ha t p erso n s violating city ordi nances
requiring work on t h e str e e ts are not entitled to
tria l by jury because such ri ght

did not exist pri or
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t o the adoption of the cons ti tuti on.

The co nsh -

tution p reserves the ri ght to tri al by jury only a s
it e x i st ed in 1859 .
In Callen v . J·unction City

43K . 627 (1890),

previously cited, the Gourt h eld th a t

extension of

the limits of a city is a p urely le gisl ative p owe r
and such a power i s not exe rcised by mean s of a ·
j ury trial.

A l andowner has no ri ght

to a jury trial

t o determine whether . h is l a nd may b e incorpora, ted
into a city adjoining.
In In re Sobn

55K . 694 (1 895 ), the pet itioner

was fined in police court for s elling liqu or, and

according to a statute of 1889 h e cou ld n ot ap p e a l to
the district co u rt until h e o f fered sure ty b oth fo r
his appear a nce a t the district court and for h is payment of the fin e an d costs should the case go against
hi m in the di strict court.

'.i 'he Cou rt h eld t hat the

statute of 1889 was un c onstitutional as an unreasonable restr i ction on a p p eal and jury trial.

the cha r g e

here was of' criminal nature and the defen dant wa:s
entitled to a jur y tri a l which could be ob t a ined by
an unrestricted appeal to the di strict court .
I n State v . o i mins

61K .

752 ( 1900), the Gou r t

1 03
held th a t the assent of a defenda nt u p on trial on a
charg e of felony to th e discha r g e of one o:t' t h e jurors,
· with an ag·r e ement to su bmit to a ver dict by the remaini ng n umb er, i s i neff e ct ual to b i n d h i m, a nd in
such c as e, in t he ev en t o f an a dv er se verdict, h e is
enti t le d to a r e tri a l, not wit h st a n ding h is agreement.
Common l aw re qu ire s a jury of twelv e for tri ~ l o f
issue s of fa ct i n c ommo n law c ases i n cou rt s of

rec ord .

When s ec ti on 5 of t h e .!:$ill o f" rti gh ts s a ys ••i nviol at e " ,
it me a ns as e s t ab lish ed, and a t welve man jury was
estab lished at the ti me of the a do p tion of the co n stitution .

'l'ri a l ·by j ury in felonies involving p ub lic

welfare a re not p ro p erly waiv e d by the de f enda n t

since

it is to th e inter es t of the st a t e t o a c cor d a j u ry
trial.
In s war z v. Kamala

63K . 633 (1901 ) , the p l a in-

tiff' acquiesed in the loc a tio n o f a boun da r y line,
and then l a ter rep udi a ted such ac t ion a nd a s ked f or
a jury trial to deter mine the boun dary.

i'he Court

held that a disp ute re g ardin g a bounda ry does not in
a p ro p er sense involve tit le to real p ro p erty and is
not in the class of controversies where a jury c a n be
dema nded a s a ma tt er of ri ght.

The est ablishment of

boundary lines by a county surveyor is a st a tutory

104

proceeding and was not triable by jury at common law •
.E'urthermor e, if the defendant had any right to a jury
trial, he waived it by his previous acquiescence .
ln In re Effie Kinsel

64K. 1 ( 1902), in denying

a jury to the p etitioner, who was convicted of violating a city ordj.nance by k eep ing a b awdy ho u se, the
Court h eld that p rior to the ado p t ion of the constitution juries were not allowed in local police courts
in pro s ecutions for infra ct~on o f ordina nces and local
regulations passed under p olice p·ower.

'l'he Court

argued that the defendant had been given a re a sonable
opportunity to appeal to the di strict court and a jury
trial, and th at the refusal of the police court to
accept an appeal bond for ei bhty dollars signed only
by th~ defend a nt was not an unreasonable restraint to
appeal.
In Wheel er v. c;a1dwe.1 1

S8K. 776 ( 1904) , a dis-

pute over a n elect ion count caused the plainti f f to
ask for a jury in -9.,~ warranto pro ce edings .

'l'he

Court h eld that · a. jury trial is n ot demandab le as a
nat ter of right in a proceeding in .9-~ warranto .

The

first Kansas territorial le gislature adopted corrnnon
law of England and all statutes and acts of Parliament
made prior to the fourth yea:r o:r .Tames .ll'irst whi ch
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were of a gener al nature a nd . were not in conflict
with the constitution of the ·u nited ::Hates or with t h e
provi si ens of the Jiansas-.N ebraska a ct.

Thus the common

law as it existed in Eng land in 160'7 became the co mmon
law of Kansas.

oince it was not. until 1730 that by

act of" Parl ia.ment a jury was awarded in .9,£.2, warrant o
proceedings, such right is not pr eserved in the constitution of Kansas.
In State v. Wells
held tha t

69K . 792 ( 1904), the iJourt

in the prosecution

of a misdemeanor the

defendant, with consent of the prosecuting attorney
and the court, may waive a trial by a ful 1 jury and
consent to be tried by 11 men.

At common law selling

liquor was triable without a j ry and so the case
might n ow be tried with less than the common law
twel ve-m,cyn j ury .

t)ince consequences of . conviction

for misd emeanor are less serious than for felony, the
a ction or duty of

society to hold a jury trial may

in this case be rel ax ed and the will of the individ.ual
allowed.
In Stahl v. 1.,ee

'71K. 511 ( 1905), the Court he ld

that prop erty seized by the p olice under order of the
police c ourt as used for liquor may be destroyed in
police court without any trial by jury so long as
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the defendant has a right to appeal to the district
court and a jury trial, even though such appeal must
be . within 10 day s after the seizure.
ln

Mil ls v. liart z

77K. 218 l 1908) , the t:ourt

held that a suit to ca ncel a lease i s equitable in
its nature and one in which a jury may not be demanded
as a matte r of ri ght.
In Atkinson v. Crowe

BOK. 161 ( 190 9 } , the plaintiff'

soug ht an injunction to permit entry onto t he defend a nt1 s land for t he p urp ose of mi n in g coa l which the
plainti f f

cl a i med wa s ri ghtfully his , and which ri gh t

the defendant denied.

The Gourt held tbat the question

to be settled was the ownersh ip of t h e co a l, a nd that
the p l a i nti ff was attemp ting to try out a question of
title to the coal without a jury, a.nd then t ake p osses s ion of the co al under the p rot ection of an injunction which would p revent the opp os iti on of the defendant.
In an action commenced for the pur p ose of settling dispu ted questions of tit le to r eal estate, and to recover
the possession thereof, eit her party is entitled t o a
jury as a matter of ri ght, re gardless of the fo rm in
which a ction may be brou ght .
In Gordon v. Munn

83K. 242 (1910), the ~ourt
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held tha t

in an action of p a rtiti on where the issues

disclo se the real co ntr oversy to b e a s to the title an d
pos ses sion o f t h e re al estate in c ontrover sy , tha t
question must be tried before a jury i f either pa rty so
desires.
rea l

this case inv o lved a question of pa rt i tion of

e s t a te among hei rs.
In State v. ~i nd erholm

84K. 603 (1911 ) , the 0ourt

held that a statute p rov i d ing for a jury, in lunacy
inqu ests, o f

four persons, one of who m must be a p hys-

ici a n does n ot vi olate the ri gh t to a tri a l by jury a s
guaranteed in t h e constitution.

On app e a l

from tne

p robate court to the di strict court the nature of a
l un acy proceeding is not changed a n d th e jury pr ovisions of the civ il and cri mina l codes are not ap pl icable.

A lunacy hea rin g is not a consti tutional trial,

b ut is mer el y an inquest fo r the b enefit of t h e person
in qu estion and bears no resemb l ance to an actio n
eith er ci v i 1 or cri minal.

It i s n ot a c ase in which

the cli erit is j u dged at fault or in def aul t and for
which there is ·a forfeiture of constitutional liberty.
In Balch v. Glenn

85K. 735 (1911 ) , p reviously

cited, the uourt held that under the police p ower a
person's orchard may be destroyed as a measure to
control ~an Jose scale, and tha t no previous notice
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or jury trial is necessary.

Such delay would impair

the general welfare.
In Cole v. vrum

109K. 148 (1921), the ~ourt

held that an action to contest a will is one in which
the p a rties are not as a matter of right entitled to
a jury.

Such actio n is a statutory proceeding in

which the legislature is fully co mp etent to disp ense
with a jury.
In ln re u1ancy

112K. 247 (1922), the petitioner,

on charge of vagrancy, was tried by a J ustice of the
Pease wh er e he waived his ri ght of trial by jury by
not demanding one a s he mi ght have done acco rding to
statute.

~ater the petitioner char g ed tha t he wa s

denied a tri al by jury .
was not a felony and that
be waived.

'l'he Curt held tha t vagrancy
trial by jury cou l d properly

P etitioner h ad waived hi s right by failur e

to ask for such a trial at the proper ti me.
In stat ·e v. Lee

113K. 462. (1923), the defendant

charged that his automobile could not be co n fiscated
for transporting liquor without a jury tri a l.

The

Court he ld that a jury is not required in suits in
equity, brought to abate a public nuisance.

:rhe

sum.nary abatement of nui sane es with out judicial process
or p,r ·oceeding· was well known to the common law long
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prior to the adoption of the state constitution.

under

police power the state is justified in the destruction
or abatement of public nuisances.
In .:>pena v. Goffe

119K. 8 31 ( 1925), the Wakeeney

'T elephone 1)ompany was disorganized by mutual consent,
and the plaintiff contended that the proceeds were
unfairly divided among stockholders by the corporation
officials.

Af ter trial before the district court,

the plaintiff app ealed on the ground th a t property
was involved a nd that he was entitle d to a jury trial.
fhe Court held that a suit by a stockholder of a dissolved corporation aga inst former directors as trustees to determine who are stoc kholdeIS entitled to
share in the distribution of net corporate assets,
and how such shares shall be co mp ut ed, and the amount
that the p lainti ff is entitled to, is a sui t in equity
and parties a.re not entitled to a jury as a matter of
right.
In Estey v. Holdren

126K. 385 (1928), the

plaintiff brought suit against a corp oration that
had contracted to buy a specified per cent of the gas
produced by her wells and then had failed to do so.
'l'he defendant succeeded in getting the case assigned
for trial -before a referee, charging that a jury trial
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would be long and tedious and would involve presentation of comlieat ed and technical facts as matters
of evidence.

After objecting to the referee to no

avail, the plaintiff by mandamus invoked the ~upreme
Court to require the respondent to grant a jury trial.
The Cou rt h el d t hat the issues raised by the p leadings
determine t he nature of the action, and that here the
plaintiff knew e xa ctly what was her due under h er
contract and the r e was nothing in t he case i n the
nature of e quity.

the f a ct that the trial wou ld oe

long and tedious has no wei ght.

The case mu s t go to

a jury.
ln State v • .l:loard of Educ a tion

1 3?K. 451 (1933 ) ,

the natter to be determined by th e court was the
amount of the valid existin g indebtedness of the school
district on a certain date.

'.Che Court h eld that such

a proceeding is equitable in its nature and may properly be heard b y the district court without a jury.
In !f;agey v. ~:ox West Coast theatres

139K. 301

(1934), the !Jourt h eld that the question as to whether
issues o:r fact in an action for the recovery of money
are such as must, under our 1:Sill of !{ights, be submitted to a jury for trial or can be referred, is to
be determined from the pleading s in the case rather
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than from the evidence.

Where the trial of an issue

of fact shall re qu ire the examination of mutual accounts, or when the account is long and on one side
only, statute provides that it may be referred.

ouch

cases require - long and technical consideration of accounts beyond the capacity of the ordinary juror.
~ection 8

of the Bill of Right s:

The right to the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended, unless the public safety requires it in c ase of i nvasi o n or rebellion.
The writ of habeas corpus is in common use in
our judicial system and it has figured in many cases
t o bring the petitioner with his cont e ntions before
the court, but there are on record no cases charging
direct violation of this section of the .tsill of .l:{ights.
oection 10

of the .tsill of Hightsi

In all prosecutions, the accused shall oe
allowed to appear and defend in person, or by
counsel; to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him; to meet the wit ness fact to face , and to have compulsory
process to comp el the at t endance of witnesses
in h is behalf, and a speedy trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in
which th e offense is a l leged to have been committ e d . .No person shall be a witness against
himself, or be twice put in jeopardy for the
same offense •
In s t ate v . McCo rd

BK . 161 (1871), the defendant
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was convicted of third degree murder in his first
trial and in a second trial, brought on his motion,
he was convicted of second degree murder.

1·he der·en-

dant them charged th a t he had been once cleared of
second degree murder and wa s being retried for third
degree murder only.

'l'he Court held that a new trial

granted on the motion of the defendant in a criminal
case, places the party accused in the same position
as if no trial had occurred, and in no wise p laces
him t wice in jeop ardy for the same of fense.
J:n stat..e. v.· c.;assady

12K. 550 _(1 8 74), a p a rty

was cha r g ed a s a principal in a burglary act, but was
convicted as an acces s ary.

the defendant contended

that a party charged as a princip a l under an i nformation
cannot be convicted of being an acce ssary before the
fact.

The Cou rt h el d that an accessary before the

fact may be charged, tried, and convicted as t h ough
he were a principal.

the defenda nt k new the nature

of the accusation against hi m and ~eing charged as
principal he wa s prep ared to defend himself against
conviction as an accessary.
In ~ity of Olathe v. Adams

15K. 391 (1875), the

defendant violated a city ordinance by keeping h is
shop open on a holiday.

rte was found guilty before

a .f'olice Judge, but upon appeal to the district court,
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he was declared innocent by the cour,t .

The city

appealed to the 8upreme ~ourt, and the Court held
that in a criminal case where the distriet court had
declared the defendant innocent, even though faet
showed such finding erroneous, he could not be tried
a second time against his will.

~uch action would be

putting the defen dant ~twice in jeopardy~.
In ~tate v. P otter

1 6K. 80 (18?6) , the ~ourt

held that the constitutional r i gn t of a defendant in
a criminal action to b e tried ,rby an impartial jury
of the county or district in which the offens e is a lleged to have been co mmittedff, is a mere p ersonal privilege which the defendant may waive or insist upon at
his option.

It is not a right con erred upon him

from considera tions of public policy ; and public int ere st s would not be likely to suffer by a waiver
thereof.
In ~tate v. Jones

16K. 608 (18?6), the Court

held that a mere preliminary examination does not put
tne accused in jeopardy within the meaning of the cons ti tut ion.

une preliminary examination for a criminal

offense is no ·bar to another preliminary examination
for the same offense; nor is it any bar to a full
prosecution for such offense, although the defendant
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may have been dis charged on the first preliminary
examination.
in ~tate v. ~ehee

l?K. 402 ll8?7 ) , the defendant

was charged with burglary in the night-tin:e ( second
degree/, but the jury returned a verdict of' third degree burglary (day-time).

The information h ad ex-

p ressly stated that wha tever the defendant did, was
done in the night-time.

:l' ime here was an indispensable

ingredient in the offense, and to convict the defendant
of third degree bur glary on such information, autnor-

izea introduction of evidence to p r 'oved different
fac ts than those stated.

'l'he Court h eld that the .de-

fendant wa s no t informed of the nature of the accusation against him and that upon a . information or an
indi ctment for an of f ense consisting of different
de grees , the jury can . only fin d tlle defendant guilty
of a degree inferior to the one ch arg ed wh en the facts
constituting the o f fense st a ted include the lesser
of f ense.
In State v. Adams

20K. 311 (1878), t h e Court

held that it was not error for the jury to inspe ct
premises without the defendant accompanying them.
ttere the defendant did not apply for leave to a cco mpany
the jury, or 1m.ke any objection to their going, or
present such acti_on of the court as grounds for new
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trial.

There was here no violation of the clause

,.,the accused shal l be allowed to appear and defend
in person or by counsel, to meet the witness fact to
face".

This is a grant of privilege whi ch the ac -

cused may waive, and in this case the accused waived
by failing to object to the procedure a t the time.
ln In re ~crafford

21K. ?35 (1879), the ~ourt

held that where, after the impaneling of the jury in

a criminal case, t h e trial is terminated without a
verdict through any unavoidable casualty, such as the
deat h of a juror or the judge , the defendant has not
been put in jeopardy, and may
trial up on the same charge.

be

again brought to

Also, when a trial is

not finished in one term of c ourt a nd is carried over
into a new term, the defendant is not twice in jeopardy.
In State v. ~oark

23K. 14? (1879), the u ourt

held that a defendant in a criminal pros ecution is
entitled, under the constitution, to compulsory process to co mp el the attendance of witnes s es wit hi n
the_ jurisdiction of the court in his behalf.

Where

material and necessary witnesses are duly subpoenaed
in beha lf of an accused in a criminal case, and su ch
witnesses are within the jurisdiction of the court,
it is an error to force said accused to trial, and
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to conclude the trial, against h is protest, before
the ret urn of the compulsory proces s issued to
bring the disobedient witn ess into court, in the absence of any reason for it not being executed and returned.
In State v-. We l l s

28K . 321 (1882), a juror on

his Y. oi r QJ.~ st at ed that he had :f ormed an opinion
tha t the defendant had committed murder .

The district

court overruled the defendant 1 s challenge of the
juror .

'l'he ""ourt in review of the case h eld t hat ·the

juror was comp etent and i mparti al in t his ca se because the prosecution f or the defendant admitt ed to

. the jury that he had co mmitted murder, but was :ma.k ing
a ca se that it was in self-defen se t hat he ha.d co mmit ted the act.

'l'he juror had formed no opinion on

the is sue of self-defense.
In s ·t ate v. Miller

2;9K . 43 ( 1882), the Court

held t hat a joror who in his roir

states that

he has formed an op inion a s to the guilt or i nno c ence
of the defendant, but that such op inion is founded. on
rwno r and t hat he h a s no bias or p rejudice a.gainst
the defendant and f eel.s he could try t h e ca se impar tially, is not a comp etent juror.

Tuien are seldom

conscious of being biased or :prejudiced.
In In re Donnelly

30K. 191 (1883), the defendants
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were charged with selling liquor without a license
and asked for a trial before the J ustiee of the Peace.
The county ~ttorney asked for merely a preliminary
examination and a co mmittal to the district court.
The def endants. were put in the co u nty jai 1, in
default of bail, to await the next term of district
court.

·:the Court held th a t defendants vrnre deprived

of their right to a speedy pub lic trial a s could have
been legally p rov i ded by the J'ustice of t he .Peace,
wh o in thi s ca se h a d concurrent jurisdiction with the
district court.

In St ate v. McNaught

36K. 624 (18 87), the Gourt

held that a ver dict of gui 1 ty on one count in a criminal co mplaint, saying nothing as to other counts,
is equivalent to a verdict of not guilty as to such
other counts, and where such a verdict has been rendered,
and the defendant procures a new trial, he can be
tried at the new trial only for the offense charged
in the count upon which he was found guilty at the
former trial.
In State v. 1'ilney

38K. 714 l 1888), the Gourt

held that an information for larceny, where the only
description of the stolen property is "national bank
notes,

u. s. tre a sury notes, and u. S. silver certi f -
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icates, money of the amount and value of one thousand
dollars~· without a llegation of the inability of' the
prosecutor to give more specific description, is insufficient, and Will be held bad on an objection
seasonably go od.

ouch an information violates the

requirement t hat the accused shall know the nature of
the accusation against him.
In In re McMicken

39K . 406 ~1888), the vourt

held that where a person under indictme nt for crime,
and co mmitted to prison, is not b ro ug ht to tri a l before the end of the second term of the court having
jurisdicti on after such indictment is f ile d , the per s011

is entitled to be discharged, unless such delay

happens upon his app lication, i s occasioned by want
of time to try the case at such second term, or is
for the pur p os e of enabling the state to p rocure material evidence.
In State v . KnapR

40K . 148 (1888) , t he Uourt

held that the trial of a defendant charged with a
cri minal offense cannot, upon the motion of the
prosecutor or st ate, and against the objection and
without t he consent of the defendant, be removed out
of the coun ty and district where the offense is a1_
leged to have been comnitted .

Changes of venue are
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to be to a county designated by the defendant.
In In re .N ickell

47K. ?34 ( 1892), the defend-

ant in a liquor trial induced witnesses to absent
themselves from court, and the trial judge cn~rged the
accused with contempt and placed him upon the witness
stand to prove the contempt charged.

In review of

the case the c.;ourt held that the petitioner was
charged with a statutory crime of inducing witnesses
to absent themselves from the court and that such petitioner could not be compelled to cri minate h i mself
by testifying fro m the witness stand.
In Sh.te v. Calhoun

-50K. 523 { 1893), the t_;ourt

held that a plea of guilty under threat of mob violence
is not binding.

Where the accuse d p leads guilty under

such threat and even after he has served a number af
years in prison, he has a right to relief from such
sentence and plea by an action or proceeding in the
same court in the nature of a writ of erro r coram nobis .
I n State v. Price

55K. 606 ( 1895) , the c.;ourt

h eld that prosecution may be in either county whe re
prop erty is stolen in one county and taken to another.
Such provision does not deny the accused a trial in
the district or county in which the offense is a lleged
to have been committed.

'l'he theory is that a thief

is stealing property from the time he takes it up until

120

he lays it down, alth ough severa l counties may intervene between these points .

Each a sp ort at ion fro m one

co unt y to an other is a fresh theft, and co n stitutes
cri me i n each county.
In State v. ~ oulk

5?K. 255 ( 189 6), the uourt

held that in all pro secutions the accused is entitled
to be confro n ted with t~e wi tnesse s against him and
to meet them face to face, and t estimony of a witn ess
given upon a former tr ial, and which was written down
by the co urt stenographer, cannot be read in evid:ence
against the defendan t ex cept with his consent .,
In State v . Tomblin

5?K . 841 ( 1896) , the Court

held t ha t a defendan t on tri a l, charged

vn t h

a felony ,

has the ri ght gua ranteed to him by the constitution
to meet the witnesses pro duced by the state , fa ce to
f ace, and it is error to admit over hi s objection,
the dep osition of a witness, taken out of t he state
wh en he was not personally present, c ontaining impor tant testi mony, notwithstanding t he fa ct that t h e deposition was taken on the applicatio n of t h e defendant,
on i nt errogat ori es prepared by hi s counsel and cr ossi nterrog atories prepared by both hi s c oumel and by the
state.
In State v. Moore

61K. 732 (1900), the def endant

was required to plead in the absence of his counsel,
who were non-residents of the county in which he was
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tr.ied, and Who, in answer to a telegram, had been

notified by the county attorney that the case would
not be set for trial until a later date.

ln re-

viewing the case the Gourt held that the proceedings
were in error, that the ~caused is entitled to assistance of counsel at every stage of prosecution, and
tha t the di strict court should have cl:PPOinted counsel
or waited on oounsel already arranged f or.
In state v . Alexander

66K. 7i 6 (1903), the Court

held that where a jury is brought into op en court and
indicate that there is no reasonable probability of
their being able to agree upon a ver dict and a.re dischar ged from further consideration of the case, the
defendant may be retried and he

snot t wice put in

jeopardy.
I n st a te v. ~els on

68K. 566 (1904), the uourt

seems to reverse the decision reached in 57K. 255
and h olds that the fact that a witness against the defendant in a criminal case is outside the state at
the time of the trial, and therefore beyond reach of
process , authorizes the introduction in evidence of
the testimony given by the witness at a former trial
of t:fule same case.

The requirements of the .b ill of

Ri ghts that the ac cu sed sha ll be allowed to meet the
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witness at a former trial of the same case.

the re-

quirements of the ~ill of ~ights that the accused
shall be allowed to meet the witness face to face is
complied with in that he h as already at the f ormer
trial been confronted by the absent witness, and at
the later trial meets the witness who g ives evidence
of what such former testi mony was.
In .§tat e v. Harmon

?OK. 4"76 { 1905) , the Court

held that where, in the trial of a crimi nal case, a
witness who had gi ven testimony a t the p reli minary
hearing was shovm to be absent from t he state and beyond the jurisdiction of t h e co urt, it is comp etent
for one who heard the test imony of the absen t witness,
and r em embers it i n sub~tance, t o testify to h is recollection of the same.

Requirements of the Hill of

Ri gh ts are met in that the accused has faced the witness at the preliminary h e aring.
In State v. lnman

?OK . 294 (1905), the Co urt

h eld that tl~e contention that adm ission in evi dence
of stat ernent s made out of court by a party on trial
are incompetent, on the theory that t h ey tend to
make him a witness against himself, is without substance.

This is not a violation of self incri(Jllitnation

so long as such statements were ma de volunt a rily by
the defendant.
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In State v. White

71K. 356 (19 06), the Court

he l d that if a person ~b out to be placed in second
j eopardy does not, in so me legal f orm, insist upon
his co n stitutiona l p rivilege before entering upon
trial, the p rivilege is wai ved.

An

accused may , if

he so desires take a chan ce on a second jeopardy, but
he must mak e his election 'k noNn wh e n ab out to be
pla ce d i n second jeopardy .

.tie . cannot h a zard a trial

and when defeated r evert to a matter whi ch would
h a ve prevent ed the trial .
In Etate v. Campbell

13K. 694 (1906 ) , the ~ourt

he l d that even th ough three terms of' the district
court i nterv enes aft er indictment, so long as app eal
by t he state is pending .defendan

is no t held in

violatio n of ttspeedy publi c trial'~ .

The state must

be g iven its r ight of appeal the same as defenda nt,
and so l ong as such move is und er way it is lega l.
In State v . hansford

76K. 678 (1907), testi mony

in a criminal trial refreshed in t he mind of a juror

.

a n event in his own past whi ch caused him to become
prejudiced, a nd upon h i s request, the court ex cused
him and another jury was i mpanele d t o hear the c as e.
In reviewing t h e ca s e, th e Uourt h eld t ha t under the
circumstan ces t h is was a mistrial, and that the def endant was not t wi ce p ut in jeo pardy .
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In State v. Tawney 81K . 162 ( 1909) , the ~curt
held that it is not prop er for a judg e in instru cting
the jury to call specia l a ttention to an isola ted
fact, and by making it prominent suggest to the jury
that it is of gr ea te r

signif ic a nce and wei ght than

other unmentioned f a ct s in t h e case wh ich are of no
less importance .

1he j udge shoul d abstain from i n -

dicating h is opin io n upon a ma terial fact which it is
the provin ce of t h e jury to det e r mi ne .

ouch co ndu ct

d epriv e s the de fendant of an i mpa r tia l trial .
1n State v. 'l.'urn er
wh ich the defendant

82K . 793 { 1910), a revolver

dug up throu gh f' ear wh e n the sh er-

iff' call ed on him wa s l a ter used again st the defenda nt
in tri a l.

In r eviewi ng t h e cas e , the ~c urt h eld that

a docu ment o r a rticle s te a lthily taken f ro m a de.r endant s
p ocket or desk, or tha t was surrendered under t h rea t
of p ersonal violence or t ak en b y force, because of
its wro ngful p rocurffinent cre a tes no esto ppel, and
the story it tells is it s own and not tha t of
fendant .

t he de -

If the defendant should p roduce such evi -

dence i n obedien ce to an order of the court it is
incompetent, because under such circumst a nces his a ct
is pe rformed in t he capacity of a witness.

ln short,

the defendant cannot be compelled to testify, but
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prosecution may use at the trial information obtained
fro m him under duress .
In St ate v . liarmon

84K. 137 (1911), the Uo u rt

upheld the defendant in h is c ontention that a jury
havin g tried a si milar c a se w ith the same witnesses
is n ot a n imparti a l j u ry .

In this ca s e f ive of the

juror s who sat on a trial and convicted a traveling
man or rap e on one of t wo g irls, late r s a t on trial
o f the de fend ant f or r ap e of

the ot he r girl.

'l' he

Court h eld t ha t the jurors h ad rea son to f orm op inions
a s to the €,guilt of the def endant fro m eviq.ence g iven
in the first case .
In State v . tterbert
cited, the Court h eld t hat

96K . 49 0 (1915), p revi ously
a defendant i n b ast ardy

proceedings is not entitled to a jury, a nd t h at t h e
phr a se

0

all prosecuti ons 1• in section 10 of the · ..bill

of' Hi ght s applies only to case s as p rior to the
ado pt ion of the constitution and to cri minal cas es .
In In re Mote

98K. 8 04 (1916), the def endant

p leaded guilty in district co urt i n Heno t.:ount y to
having commit t ed the cri me of bi gamy in .binney county.
The Reno court sentenced the defendant , and ei gh teen
months lat er he ch ar g ed that Heno county had no j uri sdi ct i on to a cc~pt his ' p l ea and render judgment.

The Court held th at

section 10 of the Bill o f Hi gh ts
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grants priv ileg es whi ch may -be waived and pleading
guilty waived such :privile ges .
In St ate v. Kuren t

105K. 353 (1 9 19), t he uo urt

held that in a contempt procee ding for the viola tion
of a decree enjoining t he s a le of in t ox icatin g liquor
and for acts done in maint a ining
a nuisance, althou gh
,_

a cri mina l pr o secution is pendin g ag a inst hi m for the
same s a les -and a c t s •

.tie is not the r eby put t wice in

jeo par dy f or the same of :fense , since in one c a s e he
is punished for a crime and in the other for co n temp t
of court.
In St ate v . Criqui

105K. 716 p9191), the uourt

held that a statute providing th a t if any morta l
would is given , or poison admini s tered, in on e co unty ,
a nd death by means t h ere of" ensues in an ot h er co u nty,
i}ie,

juris.diction is in either co unty , does n ot con-

travene section 10 of the b ill of Hights p r ovid i ng
f or tri a l by jury of t he county or di strict in wh ich
the of fense is alle ged to hav e occurre d .

There is

nothing i n the co n stitution t hat settles the question
of wher e the crime i s comm itted and t h is is p ro perly
decided by the le g islature whi ch in thi s case decid ed
th a t the infliction a nd resulting de at h were p a rt of
t h e same t hing .
In State v . Satterlee

llOK . 8 4 (1921), the

Court held that a statute providing penalty for "care -

1 ess or negligent handling or exposing nitre - glycerin
violates section 10 of the bill of .rlights for reason
that the statute does not name the acts which ar e
prohibited and thus does not inform th e accused of'
the nature and c ause of the accusation against him .
in otate v. Johnson

116K. 58 (1924), the Gourt

held th at a liquor still and apparatus taken from a
dwelling house during the own er · s absence, flDy the
sheriff and county attorney, acting without semblance
of lavrful authority to search and seize, may be retained by the sheriff, and may be used as evidence
in a criminal prosecution against the p ossessor fo r
maintai ning a liquor nuisance .

The goods were obtained

in violation of "search and seizure", but they were
used as evidence not at the order of' the court and
thus the court 1.vas not compelling self - incrimination.
The Court deprecated such proceedings, but there was
no rule against adn1itting evidence .
in state v . ~lftman
held th at

lloK. 214 tl9 24 J, the uourt

if the exact nature is no t known, charging

murder wi th a blunt instrument is sufficient and does
not ae:9ri ve the accused of kn owing the nature of' the
accusation against him .

j_

In ~tate v . Bri c k Co . 11'7K. 492 ( 1924), the C.ourt
held that a pers on brought to trial before a court fo r
an offense triable by the court a lone is in j eo:pa rdy
the same a s he wou l d be if h is tri a l had been begun
be f ore a court and jury .

Dis co ntinuance of the trial

without the consent of the accused or an absolu te
necessity bars another p rosecution f or the ·s.a.me oi' f en se .
1n State v . Allen

59K .

753 (1 898) , the vourt

he ld that wher e a def' endant h a s be en p laced on trial
on a criminal charge an d the jury is duly i mpaneled
and sworn, the co urt c ann ot a rtitrarily d ischar ge
the jury in such case unless on aqs olute n e cessity,
and for reasons wh ich ar e sufficient in law.

Discha r g e

of jury u n less thus justified wil l o pe r a te as a n ac quittal a nd the defenda nt cannot agai n be put on
tri a l for the same offen se .
dis charge o f jury ar e:

Statut ory gro unds for

sic kn ess of a j u ror, or other

a ccident or calamity, or other necessity to be found
by the court, or by co nsent of both parties , or when
it satisf a ct orily a p p e a rs that there is no probability
of the i r agr eeing.
In State v • ..tford ll '7K . 735 ( 1924), the l;ourt h eld
that a convict i on upon one count for having possession

of intoxic ating liquor and up on another f or t h e sale
of the same liquor doe s n ot violate the consti tutional
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p rovi s io n against douo l e jeo p aray .

K. eep i hg li quor

is one kind of cri minal c o. nduct , and selling it is an other and quite different l{ind; each is p u n isha ble .
I n 0tate v . ~ cL augh lin

121K . 694 (1 926) , the

Court h eld th a t where, a ccording to

stipula te d fa cts,

the d e fen d an t dra.i;tk a quantity of li quor a nd got into
his automobile and drove it along a p ublic st r e et a nd
wr e cked it a gainst a curbiµg while in a drunk en
s tup or, the def endant ' s co nduct c on stituted a si ngle
c r i minal de linquen cy and n ot t wo d i s ti n c t cri me s c ar rying separ a te an d succes s iv e p un is hments .

The tr i al

court should re qu ire the c oun t y attorn ey to ele c t
wh et her he wou l d stand o n t he c ount ch arg i ng the de f en rlan t with drivin g an aut omobile in a p ub lic str e et

while in a dr unk en co n ditio n , or on t h e co unt ch a r g ing h i m wit h be i ng dru nk i n a publi c pla c e .

I f th e

defendant is cleared on one of t h e abov e coun t s , n e
c annot b e h eld for t he other .
ln state v . :ir nrron

1 2 2K . 8 45 ( 19 2 7 ) , the Cou rt

h eld that an i nforma tion ch ar gi n g un l aw f u l

sale of

mortgaged p er so na.l prop er t y vi.here the only descri p tion of the pr ope rty was " a n undivided h a l f interest
in 20 a c res of
defec tiv e .

r11ea t of v al ue o f over ~ 20 11

,

is fat a lly

Th e defend e.nt was en titled t o ha ve a def -

inite description of the pro p ert y in order t hat h e
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mi ght p repar e his defe n se and t h a t he mi gh t not be
su bj ec t ed t o an ot h er p r os ec u tio n be c ause 01· ind et·i n i te d e scr i ption .
In ~t at e v • .Ra z ey 129K. 328 t 1929), t h e Court
h eld t hat a st at ute vvh ich makes i t

a cri me f or a

p er son wh o na s ca use d inj ur y to a not h er p erso n by
the op e r a t i on o f a moto r veh icl e on a pu bli c h i gh wa y
to fai l to ~t op and gi ve h is na me , r e s i den ce, a nd
mot or l i cens e numb e r and g i ve p e r t inent i nfo r ma tio n
to t h e i n j 1-,red p ers on the r e ab ou t a n d to report t h e
ma t ter to t he s.f-1. e r i f f or ne a r est p ublic offic er d oes
n ot v iol a te t he co ns tit ut i on al gu ar ant y ag a inst self i nc rimi nat i on .

'Ihe ri ght to dr ive an au to mobile . is

a p e r s onal pri v i le g e a nd a c cepi a n c~ of s uch privil eg e wa ive s c e rtai n r:i ghts .

}'l so i t is pr o}_.) e r t o

ma ke such re qu i r emen t s a s pa r t of t h e p olice p ower .
I n I n re 1'r ull

13 3K . (1 93 1 ) , the Cou rt hel d t hat

wh ere t h e petitioner was arre st e d Jun e 19 , 1928 , a n d
b oun d ov e r f or t r ial, bu t wh ere n o i n f or ma tion wa s
fi led by t he cou nt y at t or ney u ntil J u n e 20 , 1931,
a nd

no

reaso n app ears for the del ay , t h e p et ition er

i s denie d a speedy tri a l a nd is entitled to dis cha r g e .
- I n I n re .Brow:n

l -39K . · 6 14 ( 1 934 ) , t h e ·j u r y wh ic h

had r e tired to delibera te up on i ts verdict w s c alled
i nto court a.pd advi s e d by the c ourt tha t t h e judge
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was going to absent himself and th at if t h e j urors
agree upon a ver dict they shall obtain a n env elo e
from the bailiff' a nd sea l the verdict therej_n and
hand it to the b a ilif f ; who sha ll hand it to the clerk
of the court, and then j urors may disperse , and the
jury thereafter agre ed up o n a verdict and foll owed
the judge 1 s order.s .

When cour t was reco nvened on

ivlondey morning one of the jurors ask ed to change .h i s
v er di ct.

In revi ewing the c a se, the Court held that

the verdict reached and sealed under t he above conditions could not be ch anged .

'l'he Court i-n . th~ s a me

case held that the defenp.ant, tr ie d f or ra.pe on
Jfay 18, 1932, may be rear re st ed and charged with rape
on a_ny other date without being :put twice into jeop ardy f or the s ame offense .
In State v • .H.eynolds

140K . 2,69 ( 1934)

th e

Court held that lllhere the indictment or inf.orr$.tion
is so defective i n form or Slfb stance that it will no t
support a co nviction, it cannot f or m the basis of
pro cee di ngs which will pu t

the defen dant in jeopa r dy

a nd bar an other prosecution .

In this c ase burglary

was charged and stolen goods were descr ibed as

n

certain

goods, war es a nd merch andise of v a lue of r2 ore than ;jji20 11
Such informatj_on was held c1. s insuf f icient as a basis
f or a tri al or for jeopardy;

•
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In ~tat e v . Carr

151K . 36 ( 1940) , the defendant

charged that his constitutional rigb.ts we re violated
in that he was not sufficiently infor me d of' the
charge again st h i m in a statute wh ich provides , nany
per son who shal 1 knowingly and wi llft1lly cormni t

any

irregularity or fraud whatever with th e intent to
hinder , prevent or defeat a fair expression of the
po p ular will a t
of a felony ".

any election shal l be deem e d guilty
The Court hel d that the j_nformation

based on the statute was sufficient .

A

statute is

not ne ces sa rily void f or un certainty becau se in
cre a ting the cri me it doe s not define the offense ,
for if the o ffense is known to common law , the c 01mnon
lav definition may be adopt ed . .

ep osi ting of f a lse

and fraudulent ballots and the commission of acts and
conduct 1~hich interfered with freedom and p urity of
elections, wa s pun ishab le as a crime at common l aw .
In this case t he purpose of the statute was not so
much to denounce certain specific acts as to p revent
a certai n result.
In sta,t e v . Mccarley

152K . 18 ( 1940), the

court held that testimony of a witness voluntarily
given i n an in :µisiti on to det ern1in e the o r igi n of

a. fire, held

by the fire mar shall, under t.h.e statute

rel n.ting to the pro t e c ti on against fire , may be u s e d
so far as relevant in a prosecution for arson subsequently brought against the witness.
ln State v. :::inyder 20K. 306 l 1878), the Gourt
held that the verdict of a jury wa s void where the
bailiff, a witness against the defendant, spent the
grea ter part of his time with the jury while they were
deliberating.

it is the duty of courts to enforce

a ri g id a.11d vigilant observance of the provisions of'
the statutes designed to preserve inviolate the right
of' trial by jury 2nd the purity of such trials.

.Ln

this case the defendant did not have an impartial
jury as was his right .
ln State v.

City of Topeka

36K. 76 (1886),

previously cited, the Court held that " s,11 prosecutions''
as used ih section 10 of the Hill of .liights was int ended ·to mean or to include only alJ

criminal pros-

ecutions for violations of the laws of the state and.
was not intended to mean or to include prosecutions
for the violation of ordinary city ordinances which
have relation only to the loca. affairs of the city.
offenses against the public in general must be prosecuted for the :public in general, and with a jury,
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if the defendant demands it; while of fenses aga inst
the ordinances of a city regulating only city affairs ,
may be :pr osecuted by the city wi thout a jury.

'l'he

case here j_nvolved repair mf city streets which was
deemed a local city af'fa ir.
i n State v . Tucker

137K. 84 ( 1933), the uourt

held that the defendant was not twice p ut in jeopardy
for the same offense where a jud g e dismis se d a jury
after long deliberat io n without coming to a verdict
and upon satisfa ction tha t t h ey would not reach a
verdjct and ca rried the case over to the next term of
court .

If the jury had been dismissed without reas -

onable evidence that they co u ld n ot agree on a verdict,
then the defendant wou l d have been co· 3idered acquitted.
in Levell v . ~impson
1·endant
bitual

·1 42 K. 89~ (1935), t he de -

charged t hat in t h is trial and under t h e hacriminal. act, the nature a nd cause of the ac -

cusation against him was not made cle a r.

He contended

that the jury dict.n' t kn ow of h i s p rev iou s convictions
and did not re a lize the gravit y of' a guilty verdict.

The Court h eld that where co mmission of a sec ond or
subsecuent felony merely carries increa sed pun ishmen t
on conviction, it i s neither n ecessary nor proper to
include in the informa tion any a lle gations respe cting
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any prior convictions of the accused.

SUMMARY

In s ummary of the foregoing cases it may be
st at ed that the i::)Upreme vourt of the state of Kansas
has h eld its citi z ens to the following principles:
1.

An action to cont est a wi 11 may be tried

without a jury.
2.

(3K. 410)

In all ori g inal proceedings the Supreme ~ourt
( 5K. 213)

can send issues of fact to a jury .
3.

The right of jury trial is not vi o lated v1here

one ccm freely appeal to a jury trial.
4.

l 12K. 622)

ln recovery of money, a man ' s rights can be

determined against his will o rly by a jury.
(13K . 17)

5.

One is not entitled to a jury in proceedings

to correct assessments .
6.

( 16K. 411)

Determination of what properties may be

attached by cr ed itors is a suit in equity not
demand i ng a jury .
7.

A

{18K . 253)

divorce case do es not demand a jury trial .

t 30K . 712 )
8.

Where a charge is criminal at common Jaw ,

trial by jury must -be preserved .

(30K .

758)
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9.

Determi nation of whether terms of a judg1nent

have be en met does not demand· a jury trial

l 38K . 675)
10 .

jury trial is not demandable t·or violation

o f city o rdinance requiring work on the streets .
l 36K. 76)

11.

A l andowner has no right to a jury to deter-

mine whether his land may be incorporated into
a

c ity.

12.

{43K . 627)

Jury trial is not demandabl e for violation

of co urt injunction .
13.

l 46K . 695)

Requirement of bond for appearance and for

fine and costs before appeal can be made to a
jury trial is denial of right

1..0

trial by jury .

t 55K . 694)
14 .

Trial by a twelve-man jury cannot be properly

waived in cases of :ffelony .
15 .

Lo ca.ti on of boundary lines is a proceeding

not triable by jury.
16.

l 61.K . 752)

l 63K. 633)

Jury trial is not demandable in cases i nvol v-

ing violation of local police regulations.
l?.

s,~
18.

A

~64K. 1)

jury trial is not a matter o:r right in a

warra.nto pro ceeding.

l68K . 776J

ln misdemeanors, the defendant may waive
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jury trial or cons ent to fewer than twelve men
on a jury .
19.

( 69K. 792)

Liquor pro p erties may be destroyed without

tria l by jury so long as ther e is a right of
, appeal.
20 .
cel
21 .

t 71K . 511)

A jury may not be demanded in a suit to canlease .

8.

A

l 77K . 218)

jury is demandab le in actions to recov-er

or to settle questions of title to property .
( SOK . 161)

2 2.

A jury is not a ri ght in a lunacy inque st .

(84K . 603)

23 .

To control orcha rd disea se one's trees may

be destroyed witb out previous notice or jury
trial.
2 4.

(85K. 735)

In mi sdemeanors right · to a jury is waived by

I

failu re to ask for such tr ial at the proper ti me .
( 112K .
25 .

247)

n automobil e used to transp ort liquor may

be conf i seated without a tri a l by jury .
26 .

t 113K. 462 )

Division of assets in a dissolved corp or a tion

is a case in e quity and not entitled to a jury .
( 119K . 831)

27 .

~ong and tedious evidence is no excuse for

denial of a jury trial.

( 126K . 385)

li9

28 .

Determination of the indebtedness of a e;ov -

ernmen tal

a jury .
29 .

nit is a c ase in equity not demanding
(13 7K . 451)

Jury may be denied in actions for recovery

of money where mutual accounts mus t be examined
or tbe account is long .
30 .

A

( 139K . 301)

new trial granted on request of the cte -

fendEnt, places him in same positi on as if no
tria.l had occurred .
31.

(SK . 161)

An accessary before the fact rnay be charged,

tried , and convicted as though he were a prin cipal.

32 .

ll2K. 55)

. here a district court declares a de -

fendant innocent , even thouc;h fact shov,s su ch
finding errone ous, he c &.nnot be tried ;,,, second

t · ne against his will .
33.

15K . 391)

Trial by an impartia.l jury in the county

in wr.ich the offense is 8 lleged to ha"Te be1;;n cornn2it ed is a privilege .hicr· rnay be w .i ed .

34 .

r. mere prelimim:. . ry riearing

accused in jeo:._.,ardy .
35 .

(1 6K . 80)

doe c no-: put trrn

(16'L . 608)

jury cannot t.:.nd a defenda. t

guilty of

crirrc 1n a diff'ersr.t degree tha.r. c:..a.r-gsd., v -

lees tr.e f,:1. cts oor.stit 1 ~ir.£ t·_e e,~fen~.e chargr-::d.
:.r.c:: ·cJe ... te o.' ::"ferer t degree .

l 'Tf . 4 2 J

.....

..
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36 .

The defendant waives by f a iling to ask for

the privilege of accompanying jury to site of
crime .
37 .

l 20K. 311 )

Where trial is terminated. by death of a juror,

defendant may be retried witbout dou bl e jeopardy.

l 21K . 735)
38.

~ourt must compel witnesses to attend in

behalf of the defendant.
39.

l 23K . 14'7)

Juror is disqualified only for opinion

formed on t h e issue in the case, not for other
o pir j_ons.
40 .

{ 28K. 321)

Juror who has formed an opinion on the

guilt of the defendant cannot be considered comp e tent •

41.

l 2 9K • 4 3 J

Where J.P. has jurisdiction and defendant

demands trial, case cannot be bound over to
district co u rt.
42 .

A

l30K. 19lj

verdict of guilty on one count and silence

on other counts is equivalent to acquittal on
the o-ther counts .
43 .

An

{36K. 624)

i ·n for mat io n for larceny should speci:t·-

ically des crib e the stolen property .
44.

l38K.

714)

Where an indictment g oes by t wo terms of

court wi thout any apparent reason for not being
brought to trial , the defendan t is entitled to
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be discharged .
45 .

( 39K . 406)

Changes of venue are to be to a county d.e-

signat ed by the def end ant.
46 .

( 40K . 148)

Defendant charged with a statutory crime

cannot be compelled to take the witness stand .

l 47K . 734)
47 .

A plea of guilty under threat of mob vi-

olence is not binding .
48 .

l50K . 523)

Prosecution may be in either county where

property is stolen in one county and taken to
another .
49.

,55K. 606)

Testimony from a former trial cannot be

read from the court stenographer ' s notes vri thout
consent of' the accused .
50.

l 57K . 255)

It is error to admit deposition taken ::t~r om

witness outside the state where accused was not
present at the taking of such deposition and to
which he objects .
51.

( 5'7K. 841)

'rhe accused is entitled to assistance of

counsel at every stage of prosecution .
52 .

(.61K. 723)

Where a jury in open court show that they

cannot rea c h a verdict , defendant may be retried
without d oub l e jeopardy .
53 .

l66K .

726)

JJeposi tion from witness who faced the accused

in a former trtal may be admitted against defendant's
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oojection.
54.

t 68K .

566)

A witness may testify to what anoth er

witness said against the accused in a preliminary
lea ring against objection of the defendant.
( 70K. 476)
55.

::-;tatement s made voluntarily by the de-

fendant out side of court may be admitted in e vidence in court.
561

A defendant

(70K. 894)
cannot hazard a second trial

and t h en when defe a ted object on the g round of
double jeopardy .
57 .

( 71K . 356)

"Spe edy p ub l ic trial" is n ot violated so

long as appeal by the state is le gally pending .
( 73K. 694)
5fr.

Where a juror becomes pr ejudiced fo r reason

du rin g a trial, jury may be dischar ge d and a
mistrial declare d .
59.

( 76K. q78)

l!'or judge to i ndi cat e h is opinion up on

materi a l facts, deprives the a ccused of impartial trial.
60 .

( 81K . 162)

Prosecution may use at a trial · information

obtained from a defendant under duress .
61.

jury having tried a similar case wit h the

same witn e sses is not an impartial jury .
( 84K .

(82K. 793)

137)
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62.

uAll prosecutions'' in section 10 applies

only to cases as prior to the adoption of the
constitution.
63.

( 96K. 490)

P lea of guilty in a foreign county waives

r i ght to hold tri a l in county of the offense.
( 9 8K. 8 0 4)

64.

In sale of 1 j_quor, a defendant may b e p un -

ished for the crime co mnitted a nd for co n tempt
of court at the same ti me without double jeo p ar dy.
( 105K . 353)

65.

I nfliction in one cou n ty and de a th in anoth er

ma kes either county proper venu e for tri a l.

l 105K. 716)
66.

A st a tute i mposing penal t y for cri me mus t

cle a rly describe the acts prohibited.
67.

Liquor stil l taken Wi t hout warrant may be

used ~gainst the defend9?t in trial.
68.

( l l OK. 8 4 )

(11 6K . 58 )

Chargin g murder with a. blunt instrument is

sufficient information where e x act nature not
known.
69.

l l 16K. 214)

:J..'rial before a judge is jeopardy the same

as trial before a jury.
70.

( 11 ?K. 492)

Arbitrary discharge of jury operates as an

acquittal for the accused.

(59K. 758)

144

71.

Possession of and selling o f liquor con s ti-

tutes two different crimes and two separ a te conv ictions is not double jeop a rdy.
'7~ .

( 11 ?K. 735)

A def end ant driving a car mile drunk can-

not be held on tha t

count and on ~ separa te

c ount of being drunk j_n a pub lic place .
must ele ct one count .

73 .

::; t ate

ll21K . 693)

ttequiring hit-and-run driver to stop and

give informa tion is not self-incrimination.
( 129K. 328)
74.

An arrest with. no i nformation filed by the

county attorney until t wo years later wi t h no
reason for delay is denial of sp~edy trial an d
entitles acc us e d to discharge.
75.

jury verdict reached a nd sealed cannot

be later changed .
76.

{133K. 1 65 )

(139K. 614)

Electing a different date for r ape in a

second trial is a neVl.r o ff ense and is n ot doubl e
jeopardy .
77.

( 13.9K . 614)

Wh ere information is so defective as to fail

to sup port a conviction it cann ot serve as a basis
for jeopa rdy.
78,

l 140.K . 269)

Where an off ense is known to co mmon law

and the statutory definition is not cle ar, the
common law definition may de adopted .

(151K. 36)
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GHAPTER IX
SUWl ARY AND UONCLUSIONS
Summary
::since most of the two hundred fifty-four cases
pres ented in this study establish separate and distinct p rinciples, it is a problem to make a final
summary.

f·he summaries given at the end of each

chapter ar e co mple te, and a co mplete final summary
would amount to a rest a t ernent of these chapter summaries .

However, an attempt will ,be made in t his final

chapter to present some of the genera l prin ci p les
which the Court ha s estab lished.
In making a summary of personal rights guaran teed to the people by the uonstitution of the s tate,
it is well to point out an imp ortant difference be t ween the state constitution and the federa l constitution.

0on·g ress can ri ghtful l y enact only such

legislation as i ,s within the powers granted by the federal cunstitution.

In contrast to this situation , t h e

constitution of a state li mits rat.her than confers
power, and where a st a tute is attacked as unconstitutj.ona.l, the question is not whether its provisions ar e
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authorized by the constitution, but whether they are
prohibited by it.

~ince under a state constitution

the peo ple have all governmental power and exercise it
through the legislative branch of government, the
leg islature is free to act except as it is restricted
by the state cons ti tut ion and by the authority of
the federa l government.

ln accord with this principle,

t h e state legislature may regulate pe rs onal liberties
except as limited by the provisions in the ~ill of
Ri ghts .

!:etition; Arms; Worship; .Press; .l:!lmoluments
The section of the Hill of Hights granti ng the
right of petit~on and assemblage i s clearly stated
and decisions of the Supreme uourt seem not to h ave
a ltered its meaning in any way.
Under the right to bear arms, the tiourt has estab1 i sh~d a definite principle in holding that such right
applies only to the bearing of arms in the militia
or in other milit a ry organizati ons provided by law ,
and does not li mit the legislature in regulating the
p romiscu ous carrying of arms by an individual.
'l 'h e uourt in a number of decisions bas est a ·blished
the principle that one is free to worshi p according
to the dictates of his conscience, so long as his worship does not in any way tend to create public . dis-
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turba nce or tend to force others to worship in the
same ma nne r.
The Court has held that one is free to write or
to sp eak the truth so long as the truth is not detriment a l

to the interests of the public in disturbing t h e

harmony and happiness of society or maliciously annoying or injuring others.

Much leniency .has been

shown in permitting abuse of the truth in p o l itical
campaign s.

i.ilo long as one accep ts respo n sibility for

a statement and contends that he makes such st at ement
i n the intere sts of' the public, he may make even f a lse
assertions against a candidate.
The question of heredity emoluments and honors
confern~d by the state has nev e r been bef ore the
Supreme uourt.

Equal rights; .Politic al pow er; .Powers retain e d by t h e p e op l e
In the many cases which have charged violation of
equal right~, the Uourt has established the p rinciple
that the welfare . of the public comes before t h e ri ghts
of any individual, and even where those individual
rights seem to be guaranteed in the constitution, they
mey be properly restrained under the police power of
the state.

'fhe section in the Kansas Constitution deal-

ing with special privileges differs from simila r sect i ons
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in the constitutions of most states in th at it does
n ot definitely p rohibit discrimination.

1'he Court

h a s pointed out that the wording of this section
perm its the granting of special privileges so long
as those privileges can be altered" or revoke d by the
legislature .

'l' he principl e has been establish ed t hat

the clause pr ohibitin g t h e g ranti ng of special p rivileges and immunities refers to p olitical privileges
an d not to privileges relating to prop erty ri gh ts.
Special regulations may be ma de to apply to those
h olding p ub l ic offi ce, . memb ership in p rofessio n s licensed by the state, or other similar positions.

::-;uch.

persons have a special status g ranted by law, and
for the st ate to tak e away from t h_ s e persons privil eges whi ch oth er individuals do not even p os sess is
not viol a tion of equal protection of th e law.
in summary of the princip les established con-

cerning political power .and p owers of the peo p le, it
ma y be stat ed that all p ow er is inh erent in the people,
limited only b y absolute ri gh t and the constit u tion.

1he legislature acting for the peop le can do whatever
is not in -:: conflict with a sense of ab solute right and
the constitution.

'i'he l eg islature cannot delegat,e

~ ny of its legisl a tive power to other g overnmental
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departments or agencies.

Transportation a nd co r rup tion of blood; 'l' rea s on; ooldiers;
Sear ch and Seizure; I mprisonme nt f or debt; Fro pe rty Rights
In th e few ca ses that have been b ef ore the (;;curt
c ncerni ng corrup tio n of b lo ok , i t has be e n h eld that
withhol ding prop erty fro m an heir wh o murders h is as cendan t does not invok e corrup t ion of blood or f oref eiture of estat e.
:::iecti ons dealing with tre a son and wi th the quarter ing o f soldie rs ba:ve never been before t h e ::iup r eu e
Cour t.
Und e r sear ch a nd sei zure t he uourt has h eld that.
an individual c an be ar re sted only on l)ro p er affi r mation
an d not

on mere hearsay or sus p icion .

Hecords and

documen ts may be calle d into court, but mus t b e returned to the owne rs .
'l'he Court bas est ablish ed t h e pri nciple t ha t an
indivi d u al is protected fro m impriso nment for debt
only in liabilities aris i ng up o n contr a ct a nd wh ere
no f raud is involved.

one may be i mp risoned for

failure to pay cost s o f trial or f or ' fai l ur e to p ay
road tax and the Bill o f Ri ghts is not violated.
So far as prop erty rights of citizens and al ien s
ar e conc·erned, t h e supreme Court has estab li shed t h e
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p rinciple tha t in those cases where st a tutory regulatio n
is ab sent the rules of common law shall apply.

~lavery; Bail; Justice
The Court has h eld th at

ithouifl De:1,ay

slavery an d i nvo lunt~ry

serv itude are not invoked in f o rcing citi z.ens to wo r k
on the roads in lieu of poll tax payment or in re quiri ng prisoners to work on the streets.
Under the section d ealing with ba il a.n d p uni shment f or crime, the Court has
ci p le t ha t

esta blished the p rin-

it is the nature of the p unish ment and not

the dur ation th a t determines vmethe r it is c ruel and
u nusual.
In considering t h e sect ion gua r ariteeing remedy
by due course of 1 aw and justice without delay , the
Court has held that remedy by due c ourse of law
means repar ation f or injury, ordered by a tribunal
havi ng jurisdiction, in due c ourse of p roce dure and
after a fair hearing.

In most of the many c ases

wh ich have charg ed vi olation of t h is sec tion the Court

ha s held that an individual is entitled to due c ourse
of law as herein defined, excep t i n t h ose c ases wh ere
the g reater inter e sts of t h e p ublic are menaced by
granting such rights .

In such cases the state may

prope.r ly invoke its police p evver to curb the individ ual
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in t h e interest of the co mmon g ood.

Trial by Jury; Hab e as Corpus; 'l' rial P roc edure
In est ab lishing t h e me a ning of the section
prov idir:g for trial by jury, the Gourt has p o inted
out that the Constitution doe s
the r i gh t of trial by jury.

n@ t

i n any way ext end

'l 'he Co n stit ution does

p reserve that ri ght; it is not disturbed or li mit e d
but re ma ins invi ol ate as it was in co mmon law a nd
in territorial p rovision s
the Constitution.

p rior to t h e adop tion of

Only in t h o s e c as e s wh er e a jury

cou l d have been obtained in 1 8 59 is such right
guaranteed by the Constit ution today.

Other important

principles establish e d by the Court are that ca ses in
e quity are triable without a jury ; any c h ar g e th at
was criminal at co m.mon
.
law must be tried by a jury if
demanded; a jury trial must be granted in questions
to settle title to property; and one is not d epri v ed
of trial by jury so long as he ca n app e a l to such a
trial without undue re s tr i ctions.

Un der poli ce power

one ' s p erson or p rop ert y may be summarily handled
wi t h out jury trial where the inter es ts and welfa re
of the p ub lie are threatened.
'l'he section guaranteeing the ri ght to the wt .it
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of habe a s corp us bas never been carried to the Uourt
f or interpret ation.
The section granting to the a ccused cert a i n
ri ght s and protection in triaJ. procedure ha s b e en b ef ore t h e Uourt on mor e

occasions t han a ny ot he r

se ction of the Bill of .Ki ghts.

All prov i sions in

th is sect i on have b een held to b e p er sonal p rivilege~
wh ich may be waived e ither by def ini t e re qu est on t he
pa r t of t h e d efe nd a nt or by h is fa il u re to ask t ba t
s uc h p rivileges be granted to him.

The Court has

h eld that the a ccused is ent it 1 ed to coun sel at
every stag e of a trial u nless he d efin i t e l y w aives
su ch right, a nd for the court to proceed with ou t
c ounsel is error.

A

jury can n ot f i n d a de f en d a nt

gui lty of a cr i me not cle a rly covered in the informa tion
bringing him to trial, and any statute i mposing p ena lty for crime must clearly describe t h e acts d ec lared
to be criminal, unless the offense has a co mmon law
definition which can be used.

The cou rt must c omp e l

w itnesses to attend in behalf of the def endant.

L e-

p osition taken i n the absence of the accused and where
t h e accused has never faced the witness ca n n ot be
use d in court aga inst him.

Statements :made voluntarily

by the accused outside the court can be used agai nst
hi m in trial, and documents or evidence obtained 1·rom
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the accused, ev en under duress, may b e used against
him without vi olation of the g uarantee tha t he s..>iall
n ot be colinpelled to w itness against hi mself.
tri a l does not cons tit ute double jeopardy.

A n ew
Only in

a trial where a defenda nt could have been co nv icte d
a nd punimed is he subje ct ed to jeopa rdy.

Chang e of

venue is to be to a co unty desi gna te d by t he def endant •
.r>rosecution may be in either or any of a number of
count ies wh e re stolen goo ds a re carried across co unty
lines or fa t a.l in f liction occurs i n one cou nty and
death i n a not h er.

A

jury is n ot impa r tial wh ere any

op inions as to the guilt of t he accused have b een
p rev iously f orme d or where a judge indic a tes h is opinion
up on material facts.

Conclusions
It is a pp a rent tha t many c ases f ind t h eir way
to the state Sup reme Court on the streng t h of s pon soring lawyers or for r .easons other tban the va lid n eed
f or review.

More than one-th ird of the c a ses e xam ined

in this study--all of t h em cases which w ere c arried
to t he ~upreme Court at lea s t p a rtly f or r ea son that
they violated sections of the Bi ll of ~ights--were
found to so ineffectively c...vi alleng e these constitutional
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provis ions that contentions were dismissed by the
uourt without argument.

.illvidently many cases are

. padded wi' th charges of' constitutional viol ations for
the oole purp ose o f strengthening ch an ces for appeal.
The Supreme Uourt justices are ordinary h u man
beings and are subject to all the frailHies of man.
Many decisions have co me fr .om a closely divided Court,
and decisions bave been rendered wh en the argument
offered l'.)y the Court itself was apparently as strong
for the dissenting op inion as for the ma jority.
study of a rgume nts of the Court thro ugh _~the y ear s shcwirs
muc h incons istency and even fa ilure to make use of
stron g p rece dents .

In consistency in court argument

and reasonging is apparent in cases 11 ?K 735 and
121K. 693, and a gain in c ases llOK. 84 and 151K . 36,
all under section 10 of the ~i ll of Rights.
'l 'he Court h a s demo nstrated its indecision and
vacillation by its own reco rd .

ln 1297 the c:ourt

co mp letely reversed itself in one term on the question
of the devolution of intestate pr o- party .
and 124K. 539).

(123K . 718

Aga in the court reversed it self in

c a ses a p pearing in 1905 and in 1914 by excl u ding co mmon
law inheritance in the fo r mer case and a ccepting it in
the latter.

( 72.K. 287 and 92.K. 819)
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Much of our law i s court ..,.made.

Many of the

lib erties o r restraints which g overn t he actions of
the individual citizen are the result of the deliberations and decisions of the small g roup o f me n wh o
sit clothed in aut h or ity on our oupreme uourt bench .
Individual liberties are limite d in t h e i nterest
of the common welfa re.

I t is a maxi m o f democr atic

g overnment tha t the majority sha ll r ule, b ut t hat

th e

ind iv idual r ights of the mi n ority mu s t be r e s p ected.
A question wh ich ou r courts must deci de is j u s t h ow
sma ll a minority sha ll b e p rot e ct ed.

Cert ain l y the

in div idual ri ghts of t h e very few cannot be u ph eld
whe n t hose rights a r e d etriment a l or inconven i en t to
the g eneral p ublic.

'l'h e Court may d ecide tha t under

po lice p ower it is p roper for t h e stat e to co mpl etely
di sre gard the rig hts and priv ile g es of t he few in
order tha t the greater welf a re o f the p ub lic may b e
p r omoted.
F inally it ma y be concluded th a t the que~ti on
of p er son al liberties is 3.s much of an issue f o-r t h e
cou rt s today as at any ti me in the past.

of the t wo

hundred fifty-four c a ses whicl~ h ave est ablish ed mea n i ng
for the Bi 11 of Ri gh ts, t wo w ere before the <.:curt i n
the fir st decade o f ou r state h i s tory; t wenty appeared
i n the decade 1871-188 0; t h irty- f ive in 1881-189 0;
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